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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States of America embarked upon a massive 
global hunt for terrorists and launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. 
Owing to its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as an ally of the 
U.S. in its war against terrorism. Terrorists, having been evicted from Kabul, found the 
border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan an idyllic sanctuary to promote future terrorism. 
During this period, terrorists extended their activities to other parts of Pakistan. At 
various stages, Pakistan’s Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), Federal and Provincial 
police, Frontier Constabulary, Levies, Frontier Corps and Rangers, were dovetailed into 
Pakistani Army operations against terrorists, but their ability to maintain security in their 
respective areas of responsibility has been questionable. They had neither conducted such 
operations anywhere in the past, nor were they sufficiently trained and equipped to 
produce a matching response to the terrorists’ inventive and innovative techniques. 
Notwithstanding the sacrifices of troops employed against terrorists in Pakistan, it 
is extremely important to objectively review the LEAs’ demonstrated training skills and 
combat worthiness in the country’s ongoing counter terrorism campaign. This research 
focuses on appraising the existing infrastructure of Pakistan’s LEAs and their potential to 
combat the menace of terrorism. Since Pakistan is currently fighting terrorism with the 
Army in a lead role, this thesis will emphasize the importance of enhancing the 
capabilities of LEAs other than the military to forestall, prevent, and effectively counter 
terrorists. The thesis emphasizes that the LEAs of Pakistan are a linchpin in the 
maintenance of law and order in the country, and their restructuring, training and funding 
ought to be a priority for the Pakistani government. It also lays down a comprehensive set 
of requisite and pragmatic recommendations for the up gradation of LEAs, which can 
transform these law enforcing bodies into an invincible security mechanism against the 
looming threat of multifaceted terrorism in Pakistan. 
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According to Clausewitz, “Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting 
conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions.”1 The credibility of this assertion stands 
the test of contemporary times. In the last few years, warfare’s spectrum has seen drastic 
changes. Unconventional warfare remains the focus of belligerents to achieve desired 
objectives, while conventional warfare has been relegated to backstage. Amongst 
numerous facets of unconventional warfare, terrorism is the most dreaded one in all its 
forms and manifestations. The existing spate of terrorist activities around the globe has 
brought about not only socio-cultural changes but has also invoked a need to formulate 
appropriate responses. Therefore, many developed countries have placed a host of 
available resources at the disposal of their Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to combat 
this menace in a befitting manner. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States of America embarked upon a massive 
global hunt for terrorists and launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan.2 
Owing to its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as an ally of the 
U.S. in its war against terrorism. Having been evicted from Afghanistan after the 
cleansing of Tora Bora, terrorists found the Federally Administrated Tribal Area 
(FATA)3 in general, and South Waziristan Agency, in particular, idyllic sanctuaries to 
promote their future terrorism. Some major accounts of terrorism inside mainland 
Pakistan were also traced back to these tribal areas. Under such circumstances, the 
Government of Pakistan found no other option than to deny use of its tribal belt to foreign 
                                                 
1 Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peace 
Building, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/search?index=blended&keywords=every%20age%20has%20its%20own%20ki
nd%20of%20war&_encoding=UTF8 (accessed August 2, 2008).  
2 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: August 19, 2002, “Diplomatic Support for Operation Enduring 
Freedom,” http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12805.htm (accessed July 14, 2008). 
3 Constitution of Pakistan, “Chapter 3: Tribal Areas,” 
http://www.nrb.pk/constitutional_andlegal/constitution/part12.ch3.html (accessed June 13, 2008). 
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terrorists and their local sympathizers for conducting terrorist attacks in the Pakistani 
mainland and neighbouring countries. Pakistan’s Army was employed to undertake the 
task of countering terrorism since the government had no other trained forces available to 
conduct such difficult operations in that inhospitable terrain.  
Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)4 including Federal and Provincial Police, 
Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Corps, and Rangers were dovetailed into Army 
operations at various stages, but their performance in maintaining security in their 
respective areas of responsibility has been questionable.5 They had neither practiced nor 
conducted such operations anywhere in the past, nor were they sufficiently trained and 
equipped to produce a matching response to the innovative techniques being used by 
terrorists.  
Moreover, the gaining and processing of intelligence saw new dimensions in the 
tribal environment along Pak-Afghan border. The Army and LEAs learned useful 
lessons, albeit the hard way, and succeeded, eventually, in attaining some of the desired 
objectives of counter terrorism campaign. Notwithstanding the sacrifices of troops 
deployed near the Afghanistan border in Operation Al Mizan,6 it is extremely important 
to review LEAs’ demonstrated training skills and intelligence expertise to learn pertinent 
lessons for the ongoing fight against militancy in FATA, and to prepare for identical 
scenarios in future. 
The fight against terrorism is now the first and overriding priority of the LEAs in 
Pakistan. All components of government machinery ought to devote all resources 
necessary to disrupt, weaken, and eliminate the infrastructure of terrorist organizations, to  
 
                                                 
4 Ikram Azam, Pakistan's Security and National Integration: A Study in Opinions and Points of View 
(Rawalpindi: London Book Co., 1974). 
5 U.S. Department of State, “FY 2005 Performance Summary (The Plan),” 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfplan/2005/html/29303.htm (accessed August 5, 2008). 
6 The operations being conducted by Pakistan’s armed forces against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the 
north-western part of the country have been codenamed as; “Operation Al-Mizan” which started in 2001 
and presently about 100,000 troops of Pakistan are deployed in areas adjacent to Afghanistan border. 
Summary of terrorist activities for October 2007 at following link indicate the complexity of environment 
under which Pakistan’s forces are operating, http://www.ipcs.org/Oct_07_terrorismPakistan.pdf (accessed 
June 26, 2008). 
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prevent or thwart terrorist attacks and to bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts. 
The unified objective of all LEAs should be to take terrorists off the streets using every 
available resource. 
B. PURPOSE 
Today, the northwestern areas of Pakistan (FATA) are allegedly considered safe 
havens for Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. Many top-ranking officials in the current 
U.S. administration and Afghan government believe that the terrorists based in those 
areas are responsible for the continuous unrest in Afghanistan. They also believe they are 
capable of embarking upon a high-profile 9/11 type terrorist venture in U.S. or 
elsewhere.7 In the wake of such presumptions, the role of Pakistan is considered the most 
crucial amongst all allies of the U.S. in the ongoing global war on terror. 
The LEAs of Pakistan are expected to wipe out the terrorism from her 
northwestern areas by making sure that no safe haven exists for terrorists, and no attack 
in Afghanistan takes place with the support of Pakistani Taliban from that region. The 
Pakistani government has frequently drawn attention to the very difficult terrain along 
Pak-Afghan border, the complex operational and logistical environments being 
confronted by her security forces, and the very limited capabilities of her LEAs, other 
than armed forces, to perform duties in those inhospitable areas, but mostly U.S. and 
other international players engaged in the GWOT question the will of the Pakistan 
government instead of correctly evaluating the capacity of its LEAs.  
                                                 
7 Anwar Iqbal, “Next 9/11 to come from FATA: U.S. General,” The Dawn: Internet Edition, May 23, 




Figure 1.   Map showing Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas8 
Based mainly on the qualitative method, the purpose of this thesis is to illustrate a 
comprehensive account of all contours associated with the organization and existing 
capabilities of Pakistan’s LEAs and to carry out an objective analysis of their 
performance fighting terrorism in the recent past.  
The thesis initially develops a conceptual framework highlighting the importance 
of combating terrorism through police and intelligence operations by local LEAs rather 
than military forces. Then, it focuses on all of the security agencies of Pakistan, other 
than the conventional armed forces. It endeavors to analyze the role played, so far, by 
different LEAs in combating terrorism, highlight grey areas in their performance and 
suggest changes in roles, tasks, organization, equipment and training to enable them to 
deal effectively with the menace of terrorism. Lessons learned from a few relevant cases, 
                                                 
8 Map showing areas on either side of the Pak-Afghan border. 
http://search.msn.com/images/results.aspx?q=map+of+Fata&FORM=BIRE#focal=9a5b824f7a4e6066c69299b95b080c
6e&furl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.longwarjournal.org%2Fmaps%2Fpakistan-map-FATA-NWFP.jpg (accessed July 
25, 2008). 
 5
like British LEAs’ response to overcoming Irish Republic Army and Malayan Insurgency 
as well as ongoing counter terrorist campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, form part of the 
thesis. This may, in turn, support the rationale for the suggested course of action for 
Pakistan’s LEAs. 
The research will benefit Pakistan’s LEAs in their efforts, already underway with 
the assistance of USA,9 to improve their capability to generate an effective and 
appropriate response to any future terrorist threats. Understanding the role of Pakistan’s 
LEAs in the region and their current limitations may also be valuable to readers interested 
in South Asia’s security developments.  
                                                 
9 Randeep Ramesh, “U.S. to Deploy Training Troops in Pakistan,” The Guardian, March 4 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/04/pakistan.usa (accessed August 5, 2008). 
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF FIGHTING TERRORISM- 
MILITARY VERSUS LEAS  
War is not an effective answer to ending terrorism, but rather will entrap 
us in a spiral of violence. War will never change people's hearts. The use 
of violence in responding to terrorism would give rise to the permanent 
use of violence.10 
Walter Altmann 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 9/11 terrorists’ attacks on World Trade Center have perhaps changed the 
world forever. The subsequent U.S. declaration of a Global War on Terror (GWOT) has 
given new meaning to various conflicts around the world. Consequently, the phenomenon 
of “terrorism11“ has manifested itself more fiercely than its previous waves.12 The use of 
the military to fight this wave of terrorism has been a debatable issue since its planning 
stage. With every passing day, more questions are emerging about military’s efficacy in 
dealing with terrorism in a cogent and appropriate manner.  
After 9/11, most U.S. policy makers consented to relying on the use of the 
military against terrorists, and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 
were the consequences. Another school of thought is of the opinion that direct military 
action is never the best option to deal with this menace, because it is perpetrated by non-
state actors who are hiding in different parts of the world and are deeply disguised within 
the public. This viewpoint suggests that an indirect police cum intelligence operation by 
LEAs might prove more beneficial to counter terrorism in the longer term than opting for  
 
 
                                                 
10 Harry Kawilarang, Quotations on Terrorism, Trafford Publishing’s Web Bookstore, 
http://www.trafford.com/4dcgi/robots/03-2212.html (accessed June 11, 2008). 
11 Soliman M. Santos, “Wanted: A Legal Definition of Terrorism,” http://www.i-p-o.org/terrorism-
legal-definition.htm (accessed June 12, 2008). 
12 David C. Rapport, Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, 
http://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Critical-Concepts-Political-Science/dp/0415316502 (accessed August 5 
2008). 
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quick fixes through military operations. A recent report by Rand Corporation on ‘How 
Terrorist Groups End” strongly suggests that there is no battlefield solution to 
terrorism.13  
Empirical evidence, at least prima-facie, provides a mixed account of the 
military’s effectiveness dealing with terrorism. In a few cases, military operations 
arguably lead to reasonable success, as Peru’s military in Shining Path,14 Indian military 
in fighting Kashmiries, or the Sri Lankan army against Tamil Tigers (LTTE). However, 
most of the success in these cases hinged upon lessons learned from the military’s use 
and resultant transformation of strategies that were more in line with LEAs’ way of 
tackling terrorists.  
In many other cases, use of the military against non-state actors/terrorists has 
proven catastrophic. The British Army against the IRA, the French and U.S. militaries in 
Vietnam (1950s and 1960s), Pakistan’s armed forces in FATA15 since 2001, and present 
U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq stand testimony to this point. This part of 
the thesis attempts to investigate the causes and consequences associated with a reliance 
on the military to fight terrorism and why the military becomes a problem rather than a 
solution to the campaign of counter terrorism.  
B. DEFINING TERMS 
Before specifically discussing the academic issues of employment of LEAs versus 
the military, it is appropriate to explain the meanings of the terms used in the subsequent 
paragraphs. The use of military means the employment of armed forces to carry out a 
full-fledged military operation against terrorists/insurgents. The military commands on  
 
 
                                                 
13 Rand Corporation, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaida,” 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9351/index1.html (accessed August 5, 2008). 
14 History World Index Research, History of Peru, 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=919&HistoryID=aa91 (accessed June 
9, 2008). 
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the ground are the major decision makers and control all tiers of the operations. The 
police/LEAs, if any, work under direct authority of the military command and are 
insignificant to the overall strategy of the campaign. 
The use of LEAs16 implies that police and intelligence agencies are undertaking 
operations both overtly and covertly. The major reliance in this case is on use of local law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, who mainly conduct their operations indirectly 
through close collaboration with the public, based on the formula of working, “by, with 
and through.” 
Terrorism, as mentioned earlier, is yet to be unanimously and unambiguously 
defined.17 For this paper, however, terrorism refers to the violent activities of non-state 
actors and organizations like Al-Qaeda and other like-minded religiously charged groups. 
Although a brief mention of terrorist activities linked to other faiths/religions will come 
up as a case reference, this thesis will focus on the terrorism perpetrated by the Islamist 
terrorist organizations.  
C. MILITARY VERSUS LEAS – EMPLOYMENT IMPLICATIONS 
The application of the military to fight terrorism is a double-edged sword. On one 
side, if applied sparingly and intelligently, it may accrue tangible benefits and create 
conditions for further progression by other means. On the flip side, however, it often 
becomes a part of the problem itself. It is worthwhile to compare a few aspects regarding 
the use of the military and LEAs in fighting terrorism, their causes, conduct and 
consequences that affect terrorist networks and the overall campaign against terrorism.  
All militant organizations have a natural tendency to split, as they are not flexible 
enough to accommodate the contradictory views of different factions. This is more 
relevant in case of religious groups, who believe their respective viewpoint comes from 
                                                 
15 John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Relations Committee, 
Washington, D.C., May 20, 2008, http://www.state.gov/s/d/2008/105041.htm (accessed June 18, 2008). 
16 The Free Dictionary by Farlex, Definition of Law Enforcement Agencies, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/law+enforcement+agency (accessed on June 13, 2008)  
17 Soliman M. Santos, “Wanted: A Legal Definition of Terrorism,” http://www.i-p-o.org/terrorism-
legal-definition.htm (accessed June 12, 2008). 
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divine guidance and any alternative to their interpretation of religion is beyond 
compromise. For instance, the advocates of jihad against near enemy and far enemy 
opposed each other in the 1990s and a clear split was experienced in jihadist groups after 
the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan.18  
The employment of the military to fight such organizations stops the process of 
fissuring, and instead brings these groups, which are otherwise diverging in their 
philosophy and agenda, together. This forced convergence is mainly based on the notion 
of self-defense against a common enemy, rather than the individual group’s religious 
ideology.19 Hence, the use of long-term military operations does not the divide enemy; it 
unifies them. For instance, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan were reportedly 
never as close before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as they have since become.20 
Figure 1 presents a diagrammatic comparison of operations by military and LEAs 
and their effects on terrorist groups/organizations. The terrorist groups (Figure 1a) who 
have independent identities and different agendas (at times conflicting with each other) 
are grouped together by a military action. As a result, the military fights its war against 
the synergetic effort of a unified enemy rather than individual small groups (Figure 1b). 
Conversely, LEAs adopt separate strategies for each group and fight with smaller factions 
of the enemy (Figure 1c). Adopting different strategies for each group allows for more 
chances of success.  
   Militant groups                        Military Action                         Action by LEAs 
 
                            
                                        
     1a                                                    1b                                                 1c 
Figure 2.   Diagrammatic layout of Military and LEAs employment  
                                                 
18 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Pennsylvania: University Press, 2004), 5.  
19 Ibid., 51. 
20 Alain Roussillon, The International Spectator, vol. 37, Issue 1, January 2002, 35-45, 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a792749558~db=all (accessed June 18, 2008). 
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Military organizations have a unique culture of strict discipline and blind 
obedience along with a non-sentimental approach to the conduct of operations.21 All 
ranks and cadre in the military are well accustomed to this said way of life. Over a period 
of service, it gets engraved in their minds creating an inside-the-box thinking paradigm, 
especially since they spend much of their time at bases/cantonments in environments 
which are much different than remote areas. Thus, military men and women are bound to 
face difficulties in grasping various facets of the local culture/environments where 
operations against terrorists are conducted. Similarly, the intimate collaboration of 
military forces with local police and other LEAs is often difficult to achieve because of 
their opposing operational methods, different mindsets, and unmatchable approaches to 
solve particular problems.    
The problem becomes more profound if the military of one pursues terrorists in a 
part of the world that has different cultural dynamics. Lack of understanding of the local 
traditions and cultural complexities offends the neutral population, and by default, 
military forces get much less support from the local population.22 LEAs, however, have a 
reasonable representation of personnel who are well acquainted with local environments, 
and they adopt more logical and local friendly approaches to get support from the neutral 
component of the society, which helps deny passive support to the terrorists. In this 
context, Gordon McCormick’s following model of counter insurgency, the “Mystic 
Diamond” strongly supports the employment of LEAs.23       
                                                 
21 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Military Culture and Ethics, 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c5e.htm (accessed June 12, 2008). 
22 Support from local population is a significant component of the strategy to win against any 
insurgency as per Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond taught at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA. According to this model, the State is required to win the population to provide information about the 
terrorists, while simultaneously countering the terrorists’ influence on the population. LEAs, unlike the 
military, have mostly permanent presence in towns/villages, therefore they can have much better human 




Figure 3.   Mystic Diamond model by Gordon McCormick24 
Unlike LEAs, which have a well orchestrated intelligence mechanism in local 
areas (mostly rural, underdeveloped and remote), the military faces great difficulties in 
establishing links with locals and recruiting competent agents who can provide accurate 
and timely human intelligence. Unavailability of human intelligence is often a major 
cause of the failure of military operations against terrorists.25 This problem is further 
compounded by the frequent rotation of military units. With every rotation, the process is 
restarted, making it less cost effective.    
Most of the areas accessible to terrorists, like remote areas in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have traditional tribal cultures. These cultures 
are very hostile to any sense of military invasion. The locals often perceive military 
                                                 
24 Picture presents various nodes and loops of the “Mystic Diamond” model along with their 
relationship. The model was constructed by Bruce Defeyter, a fellow student at Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA for a joint project with the author.  
25 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 153. 
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action in their areas as either an occupation of their land, or at the very least a major 
interference in their way of life. Consequently, they resist it regardless of its purpose. 
This notion of resisting occupation is applicable even when the military operations are 
conducted by the host country’s own armed forces; therefore, foreign forces are even less 
acceptable to the local people. The perception of occupation of the Muslim Ummah’s 
land by the Western forces in Afghanistan and Iraq has given rise to the idea of 
transnational jihad on the same lines with an addition of religious flavor to it.  
 Another important issue regarding the use of military to fight terrorism is that it 
circumvents the role of LEAs or local security apparatus. The LEAs, which are mostly 
netted into the local population, become defunct as the military commanders plan and 
execute operations in a conventional military way, and unconventional, low profile 
operations by the police and intelligence mechanisms are not employed.. This 
entanglement of the conventional military mindset and isolated approach ruins the 
potential benefits, which the existing infrastructure already established by police and 
other LEAs, can accrue. The military starts interaction with locals afresh every time, and 
that wastes time and effort. Conversely, the terrorist organizations can exploit the locals 
claiming to be flag bearers of resistance against occupation by the military. That 
argument is convincing and easy to justify with a large number of foreign boots on 
ground.  
The military operations are also high profile media events. With the great leap 
forward in today’s global technology, each and every military action is closely monitored 
by the razor-sharp eyes of the media. Some of the soldiers’ intended/unintended abuse of 
civilians, especially women, children and prisoners, brought to light by the media, 
adversely affects the overall struggle to counter terrorism. The media reports showing 
extreme mistreatment of prisoners by soldiers at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay are 
the cases in point.26 The recent event of a soldier using Quran for a target practice27 in 
                                                 
26 The Online News Hour, “Report Details Alleged Abuse of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib 
Detainees,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/jan-june08/detainees_06-18.html (accessed 
June 19, 2008).  
27 “Global Intifada, U.S. Soldier Uses Quran for a Target Practice,” 
http://jinnzaman.hadithuna.com/us-soldier-uses-quran-for-target-practice/ (accessed June 19, 2008). 
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Iraq adversely affected the goodwill earned by U.S. forces there, and the highest 
commander of the force had to apologize. In the eyes of Muslims worldwide, this 
incident damaged the legitimacy U.S. military operations in Iraq. 
Erosion of civil liberty is yet another problem created by the use of the military to 
deal with terrorists.28 The terrorists are always hard to identify among the population in 
the areas of operation. According to Mao’s well-worn dictum, insurgents must be like 
fish swimming in the “water” of general population.29 The military operators, with very 
little ingress into the local area, face great difficulty clearly in recognizing the terrorists 
within the population. In the garb of terrorists, innocent people are arrested without proof 
of crime, put in military prisons indefinitely, unlawfully manhandled and, at times, killed 
by mistake or collateral fire. Such events create a critical disadvantage for the military 
operations against terrorists. They assist the terrorist organizations, who take advantage 
of the situation and augment their membership from the affected population. 
Consequently, the military force becomes a source of an increasing number of enemies, 
which hinders the effort to counter terrorism. 
The employment of the military against terrorists commits the forces inextricably 
and an exit strategy becomes difficult. While fighting against small cells of non-state 
actors, it is unimaginable to assume that military forces will be able to eliminate all of 
them. Therefore, the issue of victory or defeat in war becomes debatable. The military 
forces generally struggle to define a moment when they can declare that the assigned 
mission has been fulfilled, and they can emerge as a winner. Similarly, any change in the 
strategy of war being fought by the military is not easy to bring about. LEAs on the other 
hand, can inaudibly alter their way of fighting and bring prudent changes to their strategy 
based upon experiences during previous stages of the campaign. They can even extricate 
partially or completely without a huge concern for national pride related to success or 
defeat in the war. 
                                                 
28 Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning without War (Library of Congress 
cataloging-in-Publication Data, 2003), 87. 
29 The Economist, “Briefing Fighting Insurgents,” October 27, 2007, 36. 
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D. USE OF MILITARY REINFORCES TERRORISTS’ RATIONALE 
When debating if the employment of the military is a solution or a problem when 
dealing with today’s terrorists, it is critical to determine the effects on the proclaimed 
terrorists’ rationale of the ongoing war. The Islamic militants, at least transnational 
jihadists, justify their war against apostates through the notion of religious ideology that 
can be sub-divided into two components: the concept of cosmic war theory30 and self-
defense against occupation of the Muslim lands (Dar-ul-Islam versus Dar-ul-Harab).31 
The subsequent paragraphs explain both components of the ideology and the impact of 
military operations on them.   
Mark Juergensmeyer articulated “Cosmic War” theory, which provides a 
conceptual framework for examining the larger-than-life confrontations in which 
religious extremists are often engaged.32 This concept refers to the metaphysical battle 
between the forces of Good and Evil that enlivens the religious imagination and compels 
violent action.33 Many militant Muslims groups and individuals consider U.S. military 
operations against Islam an ideal setting for the implementation of the cosmic war theory.  
The cosmic war has several defining characteristics, which can justify any 
extreme act by individuals or organizations, including suicide in the name of defending 
religion.34 For instance, Islamists and Al-Qaeda’s networks have placed their struggle 
against secularism, perceived Western domination, and the United States, in a cosmic 




                                                 
30 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Los 
Angeles/Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1999), 145. 
31 Syed Qutb, “A Muslim Belief and Nationality by Syed Qutb,” http://www.witness-
pioneer.org/vil/Articles/politics/nationalism.htm (accessed June 10, 2008). 
32 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Los 




divine to fight against forces of non-believers. Therefore, according to all participants, 
fighting against U.S. military forces is a religious obligation, and the outcome of their 
fight is preordained; Islam in its purity will prevail.35 
Complimentary to the cosmic war notion, the perception of being under physical 
occupation by U.S. military forces is fundamental to very cause of the Islamists’ struggle. 
The origin of Al-Qaeda and like-minded transnational jihadi organizations in 1980s was 
based on the notion that a Muslim country, namely Afghanistan, was under the 
occupation of Soviet forces, and all members of the Ummah should help oust the apostate 
forces from the Muslim land. This was also the first significant instance in Muslim 
history that fighters from different nation states gathered in the name of ideology 
(defensive Jihad of Ummah against occupiers of the Muslim Land) and fought with the 
belief in the Ummah’s struggle against non-believers.  
The rationale of fighting against occupation took off in a new direction once the 
U.S. attacked Iraq in 1991. That attack on a Muslim country, as well as, the Saudi 
Government’s permission to base U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, provided jihadists a new 
enemy in the occupation of the most sacred Muslim place, that is the holy land of two 
mosques.36 Most terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda over the next ten years (1990s) were 
based on the plea that the holy land was under the occupation of U.S. military forces. 
Similarly, since the 9/11 attacks, the Islamist rationale for terrorism has been the U.S. 
military’s occupation of Muslim countries, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. This has served 
as a magnet for jihadi groups on an unprecedented level.37  
The Muslim perception of occupation persists to date, in a more profound form 
due to a protracted military presence of U.S. and allied forces in Muslim countries. The 
large flocks of foreign fighters and suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly 
illustrate the trend. It can be argued at this stage that the use of the military helped 
                                                 
35 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Los 
Angeles/Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1999), 145. 
36 Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans, Document published by FBIS (London, 1996), 1-12. 
37 Julian Madson, “The Rationale of Suicide Terrorism,” 
http://www.risq.org/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=367 (accessed June 1, 2008). 
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facilitate rationalizing the terrorists’ stance. In the absence of the U.S. military in Muslim 
countries, it might have been hard for terrorist organizations to justify violent acts 
amongst their sympathizers according to the concept of religious ideology per se. 
Therefore, it is fair to assume that use of the U.S. and allied militaries for counter 
terrorism is the contributory factor that justifies the terrorists’ rationale in the eyes of 
moderate Muslims. 
It is still inconclusive whether the U.S. strategy in the GWOT (by use of military) 
is achieving the objectives set for it. However, the continuous rise in the number of 
suicide attacks and the casualties of military and civilians indicates how the strategy of 
this war is reinforcing terrorists’ rationale. A summary of major military activities since 
the start of the GWOT and corresponding rationale drawn by the terrorists are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Event in GWOT Rationale of Militant Muslims 
1. 9/11 Attacks on World 
Trade Center  
Conspiracy38 against Muslims masterminded to create a 
raison d'être for U.S. occupation of oil/gas rich Muslim 
states and defeat the biggest force in the World-The Islam.  
2. U.S. and Allies’ attack 
on Afghanistan in 2001  
Confirmation of the notion that U.S. wanted to attack the 
Islamic world militarily, and they have started in 
Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime that 
implemented Sharia in the country.  
3. Iraq’s invasion in 2003  
based on WMD and  
Saddam’s link to Al-
Qaeda   
Further solidifying the suspicion that the U.S. wants to 
decapitate all major Muslim countries, based on fear of 
Islam’s future in the world, and take control of the oil rich 
Middle East.   
4. Failure to find WMD in 
Iraq and continuing use of 
the military  
Unfolding of the U.S. falsehood attached to the military 
occupation of Iraq and continuous exploitation of Muslim 
oil, all while causing great damage to lives and properties 
of the Muslim population.   
5. Reports on military 
plans to divide Iraq (three 
parts) to avoid civil war  
U.S. causing a division of Muslim a country. They have 
created instability through military operations for access 
to precious oil, while dividing the Muslims into sects to 
weaken them as Ummah.  
                                                 
38 Most of the deductions are based on the author’s experience serving in Asia and Middle East, 
influenced by interaction with a wide variety of the Muslim community.  
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Event in GWOT Rationale of Militant Muslims 
6. The role of allied 
militaries in the GWOT 
Pursuit of their own interests in the shape of assistance 
from U.S. or benefiting from local resources of occupied 
countries.  
7. The Role of Muslim 
allies in the GWOT 
They are apostates too, coalesced with west to protect 
their own political interests for ruling the Muslim lands 
illegitimately.   
8. Collateral damage by 
military actions 
Killing of innocent people without any sympathy to 
Muslim blood must be fought by all Muslims as self-
defense.   
9. Guantanamo Bay and 
Abu Ghraib Jail  
Ultimate disrespect for human values in military prisons , 
which in contrast, is very commonly preached in the West 
for own people 
10. Suicide Attacks killing 
dozens of people    
The only and best option to perform Jihad against an 
otherwise strong West and its allied militaries, and 
liberate Muslim lands. Moreover, a better way to die 
honorably (martyrdom) than to live an appalling life or 
die uselessly at the hands of the U.S. military. 
Table 1.   A summary of major military activities since the start of the GWOT 
E. CAUSATIVE ASPECTS TO USE OF MILITARY  
The argument in the preceding paragraphs indicates that use of LEAs (instead of 
the military) is a better option for fighting terrorism. Nevertheless, many countries in the 
world resort to the employment of the military for this task. At present, other than U.S. 
forces, many other countries are fighting terrorism with their military forces. Some 
examples include Pakistan’s deployment of forces in FATA, the Indian army in Kashmir, 
Israel against Palestine, Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers, Philippines against (the) Abu 
Sayyaf Group,39 and Thailand against Muslim terrorists in its southern provinces.40 This 
part of the thesis identifies the reasons for the preference to use of military forces to 
counter terrorism. 
                                                 




Many countries in the world, especially under-developed/developing ones, do not 
have proficient police and LEAs to deal with terrorists effectively. The only option for 
such states is the employment of their military, which has more resources and 
comparatively better equipment and training. Unless such countries improve the capacity 
of their LEAs, they do not have a suitable alternative to the use of the military for 
fighting terrorism. Hence, it is an issue of lack of options for most of the states in the 
world. The U.S., however, had both options to choose from at the start of the GWOT and 
opted for the use of the military.    
The gigantic size and huge conventional capability of the military forces mislead 
the policy makers; tempting them by promising the quick elimination of terrorists through 
sheer mass, as opposed to the slower more laborious appearing route of LEAs. In reaction 
to high profile terrorist activity, such as the spectacular 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers, 
the government comes under intense pressure from the domestic public to respond in 
kind. Low profile LEAs operations, which are characterized as unseen and unheard, do 
not fulfill such public expectations. They rather appear as inactivity and a lack of 
decision making power on the part of the current regime and leaders. In such a situation, 
the decision makers in the country feel bound to resort to military use against terrorists 
for the immediate satisfaction of the domestic population. 
The theoretical concept of handling a counter insurgency with the initial use of 
the military followed by reconstruction from other agencies of the state frequently proves 
misleading when put into practice. After the military action starts, the lines between the 
military action phase and reconstruction phase of the campaign gets confusingly blurred. 
Hence, extrication of the military without a clearly visible victory becomes difficult. 
Their operations continue for a protracted period in contradiction to the initial plan. For 
instance, the clear identification of the planned and projected phases of the U.S. attack on 
Iraq between the Department of Defense and the State Department is still a question mark 
after five years of the war.41 
                                                 
41 “Phases of Iraq War,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/world/specials/iraq/iraq_phases.html (accessed June 19, 2008). 
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The initial strategy for fighting terrorism, at least conceptually, envisages the 
cohabiting of military and other security agencies in the area of operation and the 
execution of their respective roles simultaneously.42 However, soon after the 
commencement of operations, military commanders assume authority over all other 
agencies, marginalizing their critical roles over a period of time. This conventional 
military way of working transforms an otherwise a fairly integrated strategy for all 
agencies into a pure military operation. For example, during the fight against the IRA, the 
initial overwhelming presence and operations of England’s military in Ireland averted 
any chance of negotiations with the insurgents. This was later addressed through a change 
of strategy. At present, the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq has similarly 
overshadowed the international agencies under the UN, U.S. agencies under the State 
Department and Non Governmental Organizations working there.  
The political leaders have a specific tenure in a democratic system of government, 
and they yearn for the resolution of all problems at hand within their term. The use of the 
military with intent to produce speedy results against terrorism is therefore an attractive 
option to meet their political agendas. They cannot afford to rely on a long-term approach 
like the employment of LEAs, which does not bring visible and tangible results within 
their tenure. Their desire to magnetize the voters in the next election, based on success in 
a particular war on terrorism, obliges them to use the military. 
                                                 
42 Country Study Paper, India, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/csp/07.pdf (accessed June 
18, 2008). 
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III. DIMENSION OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN 
A. DEFINITION 
The word “terror” is derived from the Latin expression “terrere,”43 which means, 
“to frighten.” Webster’s English Dictionary defines terrorism as the use of violence 
committed by a group in order to intimidate or coerce a population or government into 
granting their political demands.44 However, finding a commonly accepted definition of 
terrorism is difficult, because it has constantly shifted and expanded its meaning and 
usage in a long chain of conflicts. Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining terrorism 
unanimously, few of the commonalities in almost all the definitions are as follows. 
• It is a political act that is executed in diverse forms and manifestations 
• It includes the use or threat of violence 
• It intends to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims 
In the context of Pakistan, defining today’s terrorism is even more complicated 
and problematic. Pakistan is a country, which was created in the name of Islam. However 
it is struggling to clearly delineate boundaries between the functionalities of the state and 
role of religion. More than half of the population is illiterate and living in under-
developed areas with dogmatic socio-religious traditions and customs.45 Stressed socio-
economic environments and misguided cultural and religious connections make a fairly 
large part of the society easy prey for any radical interpretation of the religious values 
expounded by orthodox or extremist religious leaders. The radicalized groups of people 
then take the law into their own hands and create very complex law and order situation 
for the state. 
                                                 
43 Edwin Post, Latin at Sight, with an Introduction, Suggestions for Sight-Reading, and Selections for 
Practice (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1894), 41. 
44 Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/terrorism (accessed September 
12, 2008). 
45 Aamir Latif, “Alarming Situation of Education in Pakistan,” Press International Report, 
http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/know_sharing/grassroots_stories/pakistan_2.shtml (accessed 
September 29, 2008). 
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The existing capacity of the security infrastructure in the country to efficiently 
deal with such bewildered segments of the population is deplorable. In addition to the 
said domestic difficulties, repercussions from the flawed dimensions of the U.S./allies’ 
counter-terrorist strategy, including abuses to prisoners, human rights violations, and the 
killing of innocent people by collateral damage in Muslim countries, add fuel to the fire. 
Based on the perceived notion that the GWOT is a war against Islam and substantiated by 
the above mentioned incidents, recruitment for terrorists groups has increased 
dramatically in the name of religion. In such a complicated scenario, it becomes really 
difficult to identify who is a terrorist and who is not. Consequently, even after the seventh 
anniversary of the terrorists’ attacks on the World Trade Center, the meanings of 
terrorism are still debated by many Muslims around the World, and Pakistani society 
stands exceptionally divided on it.       
B. PREVALENT THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Presently, Pakistan is perceived as one of the most likely breeding grounds for 
Muslim terrorists.46 With every passing day, terrorist activities within the country are on 
the rise, and it is taking dozens of innocent lives, destroying the state’s infrastructure and 
challenging the writ of the government. Such a deteriorating situation in Pakistan and its 
effects on global peace demand a dispassionate threat assessment to identify the areas of 
concern and come up with an appropriate solution. The emergence of terrorism in 
Pakistan can be attributed to a host of contributory factors, broadly divided in two 
categories: Internal and External. Subsequent paragraphs present a brief account of these 
categories.  
1. Internal Threats 
The various internal threats presently faced by Pakistan include the following. 
                                                 
46 Vijay Sappani, “Pakistan and Terrorism,” September 20, 2008, 
http://www.intentblog.com/archives/2008/09/pakistan_and_te.html (accessed September 29, 2008). 
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a. Failure to Meet Expectations from the Islamic System 
Before the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the Muslim nation in United 
India struggled for the creation of a country in the name of Islam.47 Religion was the 
uniting and rallying force for the Muslims and it formed an ideological base for the new 
country. Muslims, who were living miserably in the United India and were repressed by 
Hindu majority in almost all walks of the life, had huge expectations for the creation of a 
separate Muslim country.48 They anticipated that enforcement of Islamic order would 
lead to numerous benefits in their lives.49 They also expected that an independent Muslim 
country would fulfill the will of the nation, establish a just social order devoid of 
exploitation, safeguard human rights, and above all strengthen religious ideology as the 
basis of the nationhood. 
However, the creation of Pakistan could never meet their expectations. 
The country could neither appropriately dovetail religious customs into the functioning of 
the state nor could it offer a comprehensive alternative social system to meet the gigantic 
expectations of its public. The consequent disenchantment from the state, especially 
among the religiously influenced groups of the society, resulted in religious intolerance. 
This has become a source of emotional outbursts capable of leading to terrorist activities 
and the killing of innocent people. Such terrorist acts are common in the country today. 
b. Defective System of Education 
The prevalent education system in Pakistan was introduced by the British 
rulers to train the civil workers of the colony for various jobs under their rule.50 After the 
Independence of Pakistan, the educational system could not be tailored effectively to 
meet the requirements of an independent Islamic state. To this day, many sections of the 
                                                 
47 Peter Blood, ed. Pakistan: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress), 1994, 
http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/ (accessed September 29, 2008). 
48 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: Fifty years of Nationhood (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 
218. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Peter Blood, ed. Pakistan: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress), 1994, 
http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/ (accessed September 29, 2008). 
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society, particularly in remote areas of Baluchistan and Frontier Provinces including the 
FATA, resist enrolling their kids into mainstream public schools, labeling them as too 
secular and non-Islamic. As an alternative, they send their children to religious schools 
for education under perceived Islamic guidance. The enrollment in religious schools is 
further facilitated by the scarcity of public schools in the rapidly growing population of 
the country. The shortage of mainstream schools is filled by a large number of religious 
schools that are not registered with the government.51 Some of these religious schools 
commonly known as Madrassahs52 are reputed to brainwash their students, help them 
become extremists or radicals and encourage them to join terrorist organizations.53 
c. Regional Disparities and Ethnic/Sectarian Polarization 
In Pakistan, disparities among various regions based on culture and 
language, along with a sharp ethnic and sectarian divide, are significant causative features 
of the emergence and growth of terrorism in the country.54 A sense of deprivation among 
the small provinces, a feeling of social injustice in many parts of the country and 
discrimination against certain classes of the society are manifest of this frustrating 
trend.55 Some of these internal polarizing issues, along with external factors like the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, the Jihad against the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and the 
present sectarian situation in the Middle East have brought Shia-Sunni strife into sharp 
focus in Pakistan. Resultantly, the sectarian clashes are spreading throughout the country, 
further complicating the issues of religious bigotry and terrorism. Therefore, it is fair to 
believe that regional inequality and polarization built on ethnic and sectarian lines are 
playing a part in complicating the issue of terrorism in the country.  
                                                 
51 Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos (Penguin Group (USA), 2008), 236. 
52 Madrassah is the Arabic word that refers to any type of school, secular or religious. For this 
research, the word refers to the Islamic religious seminaries in Pakistan.  
53 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools; The Madrassas,” CRS Report for Congress, 
Updated January 23, 2007, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf (accessed August 27, 2008). 
54 Tariq Yousuf Khan and Komei Susaki, Regional Disparity in Pakistan’s Economy: Regional 
Econometric Analysis of Causes and Remedies, Japan, Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, vol. 9 
(2003), 293-308. 
55 Rahil Yasin, “Pakistan's Four Dictators: Same Legacy,” American Chronicle, June 25, 2008, 
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/66226 (accessed September 27, 2008).  
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d. Political Unsteadiness 
Pakistan, since its creation, has witnessed recurrent political instability. 
For about half of its existence, the country has been under non-democratic regimes, and 
the other half has been under unscrupulous politicians who put personal greed and narrow 
political interests over national aims and objectives.56 Most of the governments in 
Pakistan had their own policies reversing the previous ones without any long-term vision 
for the betterment of the populace or the country. The political instability and 
dissatisfaction of the public with the governments have also resulted in a leadership 
vacuum in the country. This has been exploited by religious fundamentalists. They have 
taken control of the remote areas like the FATA and Balochistan and have contributed 
significantly towards terrorism within the country and beyond.  
e. Socio-Economic Conditions 
Since the independence of Pakistan in 1947, a large segment of the 
society, especially the ones who were less educated and oblivious to world economic 
systems, upheld their ambitious dream of an Islamic socio-economic system based on 
justice and equal opportunities for everyone.57 Contrarily, the interest based economy 
rampant with corruption, nepotism and illegitimate means has further troubled the 
distribution of wealth in Pakistan.58 The moneyed classes have piled more money into 
their bank accounts through illicit business practices and the exploitation of the 
underprivileged, while the poor have become poorer, seriously shrinking the middle-class 
in the country. Hard work, honesty and other such virtues have lost their importance. 
Dishonesty, bribery, drug trade and other malpractices have become common ways to 
make easy money and enhance social status.59 The black money earned through illegal 
and often immoral means has created increasingly visible privileged and unprivileged 
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classes in the society. This disturbs the already imbalanced social structure. The problems 
and sufferings of the people multiply with the denial of legitimate economic and civic 
rights.60 This one factor alone is a serious predicament in the country. It creates an ideal 
environment for the creation and infiltration of terrorists in various sectors of the society. 
f. Role of the Media 
A free, fair, and responsible media plays a significant role in the make up 
of any society. In the case of Pakistan, since the recent past, the media in general and the 
electronic media in particular had been strictly controlled by the state. Therefore, it could 
not educate the masses or teach tolerance and moderation in the religiously influenced 
society.61 Radio and TV stations, other than the government controlled ones, were non-
existent in the country until 1999. In addition, the government stance on many issues, 
broadcasted through official channels, has always been open to suspicion and distrust. 
The lack of debate on religious issues and certain cultural taboos leaves 
people forced to rely on the given interpretations of religious issues unquestioningly. The 
ill-informed and conservative religious teachers were totally free to misuse the loud 
speakers of the mosques to propagate their extremist viewpoints on world affairs, without 
any checks and balances.62 Resultantly, the population encountered manipulated news 
and fundamentalist ideas, which caused flawed perceptions, unrealistic expectations, 
sensation, fanaticism, and sectarianism.63 This dangerous combination of extreme 
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interpretations of world events and a lack of debate at any level has caused religious 
intolerance and hatred. This is a great source of recruitment for terrorist organizations in 
Pakistan. 
g. Spread of Narcotics 
Ahmed Rashid, a known authority on terrorism in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan argues, “One of the major reasons for the failure of nation-building in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan was the failure to deal with the issue of drugs.”64 Though 
efforts of the Pakistani government in the last two decades have been successful in almost 
eradicating the growth of opium in the country, the drug culture and networks could not 
be eliminated.65 The spread of narcotics continues in the country because drug cartels 
exist in abundance, opium travels from Afghanistan easily, and drugs are readily 
available to all right under the nose of LEAs.  
The drug networks in Pakistan create a haven for the poor people who are 
in distress due to their socio-economic environments and need an artificial bliss.66 The 
non-existence of rehabilitation infrastructure in the country leaves no way back for such 
addicts, who can then easily be blackmailed for their involvement in criminal, and in 
some cases terrorist, activities. With the skyrocketing growth of opium in Afghanistan 
since 2001 and the Taliban’s significant influence over it, the involvement of a well-
established drug network in Pakistan in the criminal activities of the region cannot be 
ruled out.67 This further complicates the unraveling of the terrorist threads between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Additionally, narco-business has rendered Pakistani society  
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captive in the hands of drug barons who promote their interests through violence, cause 
wide spread frustration, and drain an already weak police department. This situation 
reduces the efficiency of LEAs against terrorists.  
h. Sub-Nationalism 
Pakistan is composed of four semi-sovereign provinces: Punjab, Sind, 
Baluchistan, and the North Western Frontier Province. Each has a provincial government 
and a federally administrated territory along the Pak-Afghan borders commonly known 
as the FATA. The map below illustrates the geographic boundaries of the provinces. 
Each province is shown in a different color.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Political Map showing four provinces of Pakistan68 
For the most part, these provinces have been functioning harmoniously 
under the federation despite their different cultures, varied demographic make-ups, 
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separate languages, dissimilar socio-economic conditions and divergent religious 
forbearance. However, a recent upsurge in the sentiments of sub-nationalism, especially 
in the Baluchistan and Frontier provinces, has further aggravated the internal security 
scenario.69 The recent synchronized activities of sub-national elements, frequently 
influenced and supported by foreign hands, have generated strong feelings against the 
Center, namely the Punjab Province and the Armed Forces of the country, which have 
majority representation from Punjab -the most populated unit of Pakistan.70 
The sub-nationalist leaders, as influential land owners and chiefs of their 
tribes and ethnic groups, can mobilize fairly large segments of the society. They conceal 
their personal political agendas under the label of religious or cultural issues and coerce 
and intimidate the poor, uneducated populace to join hands with anti-state forces.71 With 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban operational in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
these sub-nationalist elements enhance the terrorist activities both in the country and the 
region. 
i. Incompetence of Security Apparatus 
The above mentioned breeding grounds for a deteriorating security 
situation in Pakistan demand an efficient security mechanism in the country, based on 
rightly equipped, well trained, appropriately netted and competently grouped LEAs. 
Unfortunately, the existing police department and other LEAs in Pakistan are in 
shambles. They are neither equipped appropriately nor trained to undertake counter 
terrorist measures. The next chapter will cover all the LEAs of the country in detail; 
however, suffice it to say here, that in their present state, they are not competent enough 
enforce the law, maintain order, or deal with the terrorists. Consequently, the military has 
been employed to handle the terrorists. This has its own inherent problems as they are 
employed against their own population.     
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2. External Factors 
The international participation and the global agenda of the present Muslim 
terrorists are explicit indicators that the threat at hand is beyond the borders of any one 
country. Involvement of external factors in the security situation of a particular country is 
an obvious phenomenon. Pakistan is no exception, and a host of international players are 
both directly and indirectly contributing to ongoing terrorist activities. Some of the 
significant aspects are enumerated below. 
a. Al-Qaeda 
Al-Qaeda, an international organization, was created in Pakistan during 
the fight against the USSR. Jihadis from all over the Muslim world were free to travel to 
Pakistan and join any extremist organization with the tacit approval of the Pakistani and 
U.S. governments.72 This organization recruited members from all over the world, and 
most of them did not return to their countries after the withdrawal of the USSR from 
Afghanistan. Many of them based themselves permanently in the less governed areas 
adjacent to the Pak-Afghan borders and continued their extremist activities uninterrupted 
by the government and funded through international underground channels. Somewhat 
before 9/11, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban teamed-up, and they are still actively operating in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.73 A large number of casualties to international forces in 
Afghanistan during the year 2007-08 and rising incidents of terrorism in Pakistan are a 
result of the collaboration between Al-Qaeda and Taliban.74 
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b. International Terrorist Organizations 
Many terrorist groups and organizations, influenced by or affiliated with 
Al-Qaeda, exist in different parts of the world. They are not only in the Muslim majority 
countries, but many cells also exist in non-Muslim western countries like the United 
Kingdom, France, and Spain etcetera.75 Many of their members have been studying in the 
Madrassas in Pakistan and have associations with extremist religious leaders. With the 
perceived notion of a defensive jihad of Muslim Ummah against the U.S. and allies, some 
members of these organizations are travelling to Pakistan and joining terrorist 
organizations with money and weapons.76 
The hawkish strategy of the GWOT, consequent collateral damage, and 
conspiracies attributed to the war are sources of motivation to join the global jihad in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The despicable role of international terrorist organizations has 
a domino effect for terrorism and brings recruits, weapons, and money to the terrorists in 
Pakistan. This further complicates the issue of terrorism in the country. 
c. The Security Situation in Afghanistan 
Terrorists operating from the tribal areas of Pakistan are commonly 
perceived as the major source of unrest in the region, while the tumultuous situation 
inside Afghanistan is erroneously neglected or downplayed.77 The hideouts and bases of 
the terrorists in the FATA are a contributory factor, but they are not the only cause of 
security concerns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The security situation in Afghanistan is 
deplorable, arguably worse than it was in 2001. The Afghan and International Forces 
have little control over half of the country, and the terrorists carry out their operations 
freely moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan and vice versa.78 
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The government officials of Pakistan have expressed their concern about 
the supply of weapons, ammunition, and money provided to the terrorists in Pakistan, and 
they have pointed fingers to the porous borders with Afghanistan. It is more logical to 
believe in the continuously expanding income of Taliban from their bumper crops of 
opium79 in Afghanistan.80 The Afghan refugees, who keep moving across borders in 
flocks, create another dilemma for the Pakistani government. Presently, Pakistan hosts 
more than two million refugees, and many of them maintain their associations with 
different terrorist organizations. This contributes to the unrest and terrorist activities both 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan.81  
d. Involvement of India 
Historically, the enmity between Pakistan and India is as old as the two 
countries. They have fought three full-blown wars and many skirmishes along their 
borders.82 Both countries are reputed to have the continuous involvement of their secret 
agencies in clandestine operations against each other to create unrest and destabilization. 
The present unrest in Pakistan gives India an opportunity to collaborate with anti-state 
elements in Pakistan, about which Pakistani officials have often expressed their 
concern.83 
India is considered the main supply line of weapons and finances to the 
terrorists in Baluchistan and NWFP. Moreover, after 9/11, the U.S. joined hands with the 
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to uproot the nexus of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
Through this arrangement, India gained influence in Afghanistan with the help of their 
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old time allies-The Northern Alliance.84 Instead of contributing to the establishment of 
security and restructuring of Afghanistan, India established several consulates in 
Afghanistan along the borders of Pakistan. These are seriously questioned in Pakistan and 
are believed to support militancy in the FATA.  
e. Role of Muslim Countries 
Since the 1980s, many Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran and Syria, have supported various religious and 
sectarian organizations in Pakistan. This assistance is not only coming from the 
governments of the said Muslim countries, but also from various individuals and charities 
within them. With the present volatility in the region and the global interests involved 
there, the aforementioned Muslim countries play their part to safeguard their own 
interests and consequently complicate the issue of terrorism in Pakistan. For instance, the 
United Arab Emirates have been reportedly involved in terrorist activities against the 
newly constructed Gwadar Port, perhaps because they fear competition with Dubai 
Port.85 Similarly, Iran assisted the Shia community in Pakistan and leftists in Baluchistan 
to create unrest in the Province.86 Anti-U.S. groups are also playing their part to 
strengthen the terrorists in Pakistan. 
f. Trust Deficit in Pak-U.S. Relations 
In recent months, U.S. officials blaming Pakistan for not doing enough 
against the terrorists in the FATA has been a common feature in the international 
media.87 Pakistan, however, claims to be the biggest victim of the current terrorism and 
stands affronted because her sacrifices in counter terrorism are being trivialized. Since 
2001, Pakistan has lost many innocent lives, including former Prime Minister Benazir 
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Bhutto and more than 1200 security personnel, in the counter terrorism campaign led by 
the USA.88 There have been hundreds of suicide attacks, which severely damages to the 
economy and destabilizes of the country. 
With such a dismal state of affairs, the blame game being played against 
Pakistan is seen with suspicion and resentment by the country’s population. The 
increased number of U.S. attacks inside Pakistan in last six months and resultant soft 
response of the Pakistani Government have further increased frustration in the country. 
This has motivated many tribes and individual groups and organizations to take arms 
against their own government and the U.S. This unnecessary entanglement, a result of 
trust-deficit between both countries, has increased anti-U.S. sentiments among the 
population of Pakistan thereby increasing the number of terrorist activities in the country.  
C. TERRORISTS’ METHODOLOGY 
In order to achieve their objectives, the terrorists in Pakistan follow one or more 
of the methodologies enumerated below.  
1. Kidnapping for Ransom, Assassination and Blackmail 
Kidnapping incidents of government officials and security forces by terrorists 
have become a frequent feature of terrorism in Pakistan. Terrorist organizations ambush 
convoys of government officials, including the foreign  dignitaries and members of the 
police and armed forces, when they are traveling in small groups and with less security. 
After the abduction, the terrorists take the hostages to underground places and present a 
list of demands to the government.  
The terrorists’ demands vary and include ransom, the release of captured 
terrorists, and policy changes in the war against terrorism. The kidnapping of Tariq 
Azizuddin,89 Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan in February 2008 near Pak-Afghan 
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border and Abdul Khaliq Farahi,90 Afghanistan’s ambassador-designate to Pakistan in 
September 2008 are a few of the major incidents of this kind. Similarly, dozens of 
personnel from Pakistan’s security forces have been kidnapped. The hostages have either 
been cruelly assassinated or traded for the release of captured terrorists.91 
2. Bombs/Rockets/IEDs 
Bombs, rockets and IEDs, each with different innovative methods of launch and 
ignition, have become favorite weapons of terrorists in Pakistan. They use rockets and 
remote control bombs, launched from the elevated peaks of the mountainous terrain in the 
FATA, to attack military camps or moving convoys of security forces. Figure 5 indicates 
the difficulty of movement into the FATA areas and the multitude of bottlenecks, which 
can be easily exploited by the terrorists. 
 
Figure 5.   Physical Terrain in FATA92 
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Similarly, the placing IEDs on the expected routes of the security forces and 
exploding them at the right moment, all while sitting invisibly, is a common technique 
employed by the terrorists. For terrorists, there is less risk involved with these weapons, 
and they are extremely effective in causing damage to infrastructure and inflicting 
casualties. These weapons, disguised in suitcases, shopping bags, toy bombs, and bicycle 
bombs are also commonly used in public places to disrupt public life, create municipal 
anxiety and challenge the writ of the state.93 As the terrorists bear a resemblance to the 
population of the area where their activities are normally undertaken, their identification 
and apprehension during the planning and execution stage of any terrorist act has been 
problematic. 
3. Suicide Bombing 
As in Iraq and Afghanistan, suicide terrorism has become the most lethal and 
devastating method of terrorism in Pakistan. In the last few years, an ever-increasing 
supply of mentally indoctrinated individuals, with high motivation for heavenly life after 
death, has taken hundreds of lives in Pakistan. The ineffectiveness of a counter strategy to 
the threat of suicide terrorism has become a grave concern for the Pakistani government. 
Suicide terrorists select high profile targets or attack security forces with the 
intent to create real panic among the masses after each attack.94 Suicide bombers killed 
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto95 and Lieutenant General Mushtaq Ahmed Beg96 
in Rawalpindi. They also made many attempts on the lives of then President Pervez 
Musharraf,97 Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz,98 and interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan 
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Sherpao.99 These dreadful attacks on the highest-ranking officials who enjoyed the best 
security arrangements in the country caused colossal upheaval among the general public 
in Pakistan.  
Shaul Shay, in his explanation of suicide terrorism lays down some reasons why 
this form of terrorism is preferred by terrorist organizations. Some reasons applicable to 
terrorism in Pakistan are as follows.100 
• Suicide attacks cause multiple deaths and grave damage to property. More 
importantly, people react to suicide incidents with exceptional horror, 
more so than to conventional terrorist attacks.101 The latest attacks on the 
Marriot Hotel in Islamabad, which killed more than fifty people and 
caused significant damage to property and exceptional horror for the 
public, stand testimony to the point.102   
• Suicide attacks receive broad media coverage. A suicide attack is a “media 
event,” as it requires determination and martyrdom on the terrorist’s part. 
Hence, it attracts more recruits for terrorist organizations. The growing 
incidents of suicide terrorism substantiate this argument.  
• The control over the timing and venue enhances the lethality to cause 
optimal harm, more so than other techniques, like detonating an explosive 
charge using a clock or remote control. The suicide attacker is a 
sophisticated guided missile that knows how to launch the explosive 
charge at the appropriate place and time. 
• Once the suicide attacker has set out on a mission, his success is almost 
guaranteed, because it is very hard to prevent the attack. Even if the 
security forces prevent his advancement towards the planned target, he can 
always change the target or detonate himself among the security forces. In 
the recent past, such attacks against the police force and military convoys 
have been frequent in Pakistan.103  
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• A suicide mission does not necessitate the preparation of escape routes, 
which constitutes a complex part of other types of attacks. Therefore, 
terrorist organizations prefer their members to adopt this method, avoiding 
the need for an extrication plan. 
• In a suicide mission, the attacker is killed during the attack. There is no 
fear that he will fall into the hands of the enemy and divulge information 
about the organization. To date, very few potential suicide bombers have 
been arrested in Pakistan. Therefore, security forces have limited 
information on the terrorists’ strategy to brainwash and indoctrinate 
people for suicide terror. 
4. Use of Human Shields 
Terrorists, especially in tribal areas near the Pak-Afghan border, skillfully plan 
and use the local populace as human shields. In some cases, where the writ of the state is 
weak and the terrorists have influence, they coerce or intimidate the locals to stay around 
them and provide them support against security forces. As an IO campaign, with a view 
to ensure that no local person gives any information about the terrorists to government 
agencies, they ruthlessly kill suspects in public. This warns others not to attempt such 
ventures in the future.104 This phenomenon of human shield leads to collateral damage 
and causes death or injuries to innocent people. This has its own ramifications in the 
overall war against terrorism. 
5. Monitoring and Intelligence of Targets 
Terrorists carry out a deliberate selection of targets, which is followed by a 
process of constant monitoring and gathering of intelligence about the composition, 
pattern of activities and environments around them. Post attack analysis of the attempts to 
kill President Pervez Musharraf has revealed that for many days the terrorists monitored 
the move pattern of his cavalcade and possible soft points, including bottlenecks, to plan 
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and execute their nefarious designs.105 The tactic of appropriate monitoring and 
intelligence gathering about the target, combined with the use of suicide terrorists, 
enhances the efficacy of the terrorists and creates a serious problem for the state. 
6. Use of Latest Technology 
The post-analysis reports on many terrorists’ activities in Pakistan establish that 
terrorists make the best use of the latest technologies, especially regarding 
communication and explosives. The use of mobile phone chips for distant bomb 
detonation in attacks on the convoys of the Karachi Corp Commander and President 
Pervez Musharraf indicate this trend.106 Similarly, the use of satellite mobile phones has 
been a permanent feature of all terrorist activities in Pakistan. Moreover, security forces, 
during their operations at Wana in 2004, captured the latest communication gadgets, 
including telephone exchanges, Thoraya satellite telephones, laptops, and software CDs - 
including the latest designs and techniques for bomb making and IEDs.107 The 
preparation of propaganda movies and the frequent issue of fatwas and sermons on the 
internet are yet another example of the terrorists’ use of the latest technology. 
7. Break and Change of Pattern 
The terrorists are always changing the pattern of their activities and adopting the 
most innovative, inventive, and modern methodologies to offset the counter measures 
planned by the security forces. They alternate among a variety of techniques. They use 
moving personnel of all ages as suicide bombers, at times dressed in traditional ladies’ 
garb. They employ vehicles of all kinds from jeeps to trucks as a moving platform for 
their activities. They attack mosques, funeral ceremonies, religious schools, girls’ 
institutions, power stations, train tracks, military installations, and police training centers, 
banks, restaurants, tribal heads, politicians, religious scholars, and many other targets. 
                                                 
105 “Pakistan Court Upholds Death Penalty in Musharraf Attack Case,” Peoples Daily Online, March 
15, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/15/eng20060315_250628.html accessed October 4, 
2008). 
106 MI5 Official Site, “Terrorist Methods,” http://www.securityservice.gov.uk/output/Page27.html 
(accessed October 4, 2008). 
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The terrorists also alternate between attacks on single targets and simultaneous 
detonations at many places. When setting simultaneous explosions, a series of bombs are 
plotted at different congested public sites with a timed pattern to cause lethal destruction 
and affect paralysis on the security mechanism of the country. One example occurred on 
October 15, 2003, when twenty-one bomb blasts at Petrol Stations rocked Karachi. 
The terrorists are mercilessly and evilly innovative. In an attempt to kill former 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Karachi during her welcome procession, a terrorist 
tried to hand her an infant (few months old) laden with explosives and dressed in her 
party color.108 Although she did not hold that young innocent boy and escaped death at 
that instant, more than fifty workers of her party lost their lives because of that 
unimaginably brutal baby explosion.109  
8. Exploitation of Weaknesses of LEAs 
Many terrorist activities in Pakistan during last few years and the modus operandi 
adopted to execute them suggest that terrorists weigh the strengths and weaknesses of 
security forces before planning any attack. With a well-thought out plan, terrorists carry 
out their acts, exploiting the weaknesses and shortfalls of equipment, methodology and 
techniques used by security forces. 
In year 2008 alone, terrorists have attacked police forces more than ten times, 
identifying loopholes in their procedures and breaching their security system. The 
successful bombing of the Marriot Hotel at Islamabad in September,110 killing more than 
fifty personnel and burning many buildings right in the center of the capital stands 
testimony to the fact that terrorists are exploiting the existing shortfalls of security forces  
 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West (New York: HarperCollins 
Publisher, 2008), 13. 
109 “Exclusive: Benazir Bhutto’s Last Testament,” The Sunday Times, February 3, 2008, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3294410.ece (accessed October 2, 2008). 
110 Peter Symonds, “Marriot Hotel Bombing: Another Sign of Pakistan’s Deepening Crisis,” World 
Socialist Web Site, September 22, 2008, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/sep2008/paks-s22.shtml 
(accessed October 4, 2008). 
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in Pakistan. Figure 6 represents the monthly number of casualties in Pakistan. It 




Figure 6.   Number of Casualties in Pakistan during 2008111  
D. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan is presently confronted with various dimensions of terrorism, which 
cause instability in the country. Terrorists have taken thousands of innocent lives, ruined 
dozens of villages, created panic among the population in all parts of the country and 
challenged the security apparatus of the state. As discussed, many internal and external 
players are contributing negatively to the ongoing quagmire, not only in the country, but 
also in the region. The terrorists are making the best use of technological advancements 
and innovative techniques to seriously jeopardize the writ of the state. Contrarily, the 
performance of the LEAs to handle the security situation in the country leaves much to be 
                                                 
111 Muhammad Azam, “South Asia Conflict Report July 2008,” Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies: 
South Asia Net, August 10, 2008, http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN-Files/SAN-SouthAsia/SAN-SouthAsia-
Article44/San-SA-A44-D.asp (accessed October 4, 2008). 
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desired. The scenario necessitates a pragmatic and well thought out upgrade plan to 
ensure that the LEAs in the country are appropriately grouped, efficiently organized, 
vigorously trained and properly equipped. The next chapter presents an account of all 
LEAs in Pakistan along with an objective analysis of their efficacy to the tasks assigned.  
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IV. PAKISTAN LEAS – A PROLOGUE AND FAMILIARIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan has an existing security infrastructure built upon a fairly large number of 
LEAs; each varying in size, role and level of proficiency. They, at least theoretically, are 
structured to protect all parts of the country against any security threat, including 
terrorism in any of its forms and manifestations. However, their actual state of 
preparedness to guard against terrorism and undertake harmonious security operations in 
the country is quite deplorable. Most of them are too ill-equipped, weakly trained, and 
incongruously organized to triumph over the serious challenges posed by the terrorists in 
the country.112 To further develop the subject, it is of utmost importance to have a 
familiarization with all the LEAs of the country. Subsequent paragraphs present an 
overview with a special focus on the origin, background history, mandate allotted, and 
state of preparedness of all the existing LEAs of Pakistan.  
B. PAKISTAN POLICE 
1. The Origin of the Police Force113 
After gaining full control of United India, British rulers constituted a Police 
Commission on August 17, 1860 for the organization of a police force. The commission 
submitted its report within 22 days, and a draft Police Act was enacted in 1861 which 
resulted in a formal police force. This Police Act was drafted along the lines of Irish 
                                                 
112 David Rohde, “Threats and Responses: Law Enforcement; Pakistan’s Police Force Struggles to 
Find the Resources It Needs to Combat Terrorism,” New York Times, September 30, 2002, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03EFD91438F933A0575AC0A9649C8B63 (accessed 
October 5, 2008).  
113 The historical account of the origin of the police department has been summarized from the 
Visitors’ Brief of the Pakistan Police and the author’s interview with the Senior Superintendent of Police, 
Sialkot District in July 2006. The interview and collection of data about the Police Department was done 
for a study on “Restructuring of Pakistan’s LEAs.” The study was presented at General Headquarters, 
Rawalpindi on August 31, 2006, and the author was one of the members of the study panel.   
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Constabulary Act114 and was primarily preordained to create a police force that could 
consolidate and maintain the British Raj in India without any regard for the rights of the 
citizens. Ironically, the mandate laid down for this police force by the British rulers was 
very different from the philosophy, duties and objectives of the police forces in the 
United Kingdom. The police force in India was envisioned as an authoritarian and 
suppressive force without any outlook of being a service to the population of the country. 
In July 1902, the government of India appointed a seven member commission, 
headed by A.H.L Fraser, to review the performance of its police force and recommend 
feasible improvements for its effectiveness. The commission recommended limited 
organizational and procedural modifications under which the force continued working for 
next three decades. The Police Rules were framed for the first time in 1934, providing 
detailed instructions and comprehensive procedures for all aspects police operations.115 
The Independence of Pakistan in 1947 did not bring any major changes to the 
Police Act of 1861. During the next four decades, various administrations of Pakistan, in 
their uncommitted endeavors, appointed about two dozen commissions and committees 
to propose improvements for the Police Force. An overall lack of resolve and scarcity of 
resources meant most efforts at improvement were in vain. However, the Musharraf 
regime introduced the Police Ordinance 2002,116 which had a wide-ranging plan to 
transform the police department into a modern force. 
The Police Ordinance 2002, though a well thought out and comprehensive 
document, brought little and sluggish improvement in the police force owing to a host of 
problems related to its implementation, political compulsions and resource constraints. 
More significantly, the lack of commitment from the Federal Government to pursue a 
ruthless implementation of the Ordinance has slowed progress in the improvement of the 
police force.            
                                                 
114 Royal Irish Constabulary, “The Oxford Companion to Irish History,” 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O245-RoyalIrishConstabulary.html (accessed October 20, 2008).  
115 The Punjab Government, “The Punjab Police Rules 1934,” 
http://haryanapolice.gov.in/PPR/PPR_Volume-II.pdf (accessed October 12, 2008).  
116 The Government of Pakistan, “Police Ordinance 2002,” 
http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/police_ordinance.pdf (accessed October 15, 2008). 
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2. Types of Police Services 
In Pakistan, the Police Services are structured into the following categories.117 
 
Type of Police Responsibility 
Federal Capital Police Maintains law and order within the 
boundaries of Islamabad- The Capital  
Provincial Police for each 
Province 
Responsible for maintenance within the 
boundaries of respective provinces  
Railways Police Guards the security of trains, railway 
tracks, and infrastructure  
Prisons Police Responsible for security of all prisons 
in the country 
Federal Investigation Agency The Federal Intelligence Agency  
Levies Force  Maintains security for category B areas 
in Balochistan 
Frontier Constabulary  Maintains law and order in the tribal 
areas 
Table 2.   Branches of Pakistan Police and their responsibility 
3. Organization 
All police services have their own organizational structures at federal and 
provincial levels respectively, and they work in parallel with very limited coordination  
 
                                                 
117 In addition to these types of the police, which work almost independently and continuously 
without any cooperation from other respective domains of the service, Pakistan has other types of the police 
forces like the Motorway Police under the Federal Government, the Patrol Police in many districts of the 
Punjab under the Provincial Government, and certain rescue services in all provinces. Such police forces, 
mainly created during the Musharraf Regime (1999- 2008), are performing their responsibilities in a 
comparatively efficient manner and are well respected in the country without any political involvement. 
However, with the democratic government in place and prevalent appalling reputation of the governments 
in politicizing police institutions for their personal agendas, the future performance of these police forces is 
yet to be seen.       
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among them.118 Although each has a specific role, the federal and four provincial police 
departments have wider ambit of duties and are the main forces responsible to counter 
terrorism. Their approximate strength119 is as follows. 
1. Federal Police  20,000 
2. Punjab 115,000  
In addition, Elite force of company size is 
organized at Divisional level, which can 
react at short notice. 
3. Sind 90,000 
4. NWFP 44,000 
5. Balochistan 13,000 
4. Problem Areas 
Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, a well respected officer of the Pakistan Police, 
highlights some of the serious constraints undermining the police system of Pakistan, 
including the following aspects.120 
• An outdated legal and institutional framework121 devised for nineteenth 
century united India, consisting of near static villages with little 
urbanization or industrialization, and meant principally for a colonial rule 
• Arbitrary and whimsical (mis)management of the police by the executive 
authority of the state. Policemen were increasingly recruited, trained, 
promoted and posted without regard to merit and mainly for their 
subservience to people with influence and power.  
• Derisory accountability of individuals and branches 
• Poor and meritless incentive system within the Department 
 
                                                 
118 David Rohde, “Threats and Responses: Law Enforcement; Pakistan’s Police Force Struggles to 
Find the Resources It Needs to Combat Terrorism,” The New York Times, September 30, 2002, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03EFD91438F933A0575AC0A9649C8B63 (accessed 
October 5, 2008). 
119 The data is collected from various briefs and presentations of the policed in 2005-2006, which 
often kept varying due to the policies of different provincial governments and the enrollment/retirement of 
the police personnel.  
120 Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, “Reforming Pakistan Police: An Overview,” 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008). 
121 Ibid. 
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• Widespread corruption and nepotism 
• Severe under-resourcing of law and order apparatus 
5. Weapons, Equipment and Communication 
All branches of the police department have an acute shortage of equipment and 
vehicles. The limited available equipment is in a pitiable state, which is further 
aggravated by the lack of maintenance funds.122 Major weapons held by the police force 
include an insufficient number of pistols and revolvers (.38 bore, 9mm), rifle G-3, rifle 
303, sub machine guns / carbines, machine guns and AK - 47 rifles. The police are using 
old Motorola wireless sets from the 1980s, which have a limited communication range 
and are open to easy jamming by terrorists. Single line communication has been 
established through Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, which is a 
government owned company reputed for poor service. In addition, they have no special 
priority set for the maintenance of lines in case of a breakdown. 
6. Training 
The National Police Academy in Islamabad is only training police officers, 
whereas the lower ranks are trained through the Police Training Colleges and Centers in 
each province.123 Despite some improvement in the last few years, the training colleges 
and centers are inappropriately outfitted for the comprehensive training of the police 
force. There is no research and analysis wing either in the colleges or in the Academy. 
The department has very limited facilities to train for counter terrorist activities. For the 
most part, they resort to on-job-training.124 The maiden Anti Terrorist Training School at 
Razzaq Abad, Lahore is the principal training institution, but it can only run a few 
courses for a limited number of personnel. 
                                                 
122 Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, “Reforming Pakistan Police: An Overview,” 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008). 
123 Government of Pakistan, “National Police Academy,” 
http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentInfo.jsp?DivID=23&cPath=221_227_309&ContentID=779 
(accessed October 11, 2008). 
124 International Crisis Group, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police,” July 14, 2008, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5570 (accessed October 2, 2008). 
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C. FRONTIER CONSTABULARY 
1. Origin and Tasks125 
The Frontier Constabulary, in its present shape, was established in 1913 to guard 
the administered borders of NWFP. However, their tasks have continued to evolve and 
presently, the Frontier Constabulary looks after its jurisdiction from the Northern Areas 
of Pakistan to Karachi. It is governed by the Frontier Constabulary Act of 1915. The 
force was originally tasked to check tribal incursions and criminal gangs operating from 
the tribal and border areas, and control outlaws and their criminal activities in the border 
areas. However, since its inception, the following additional tasks have been undertaken 
by the force. 
• Support other LEAs in grave emergencies 
• Assist local administration and police in the maintenance of law and order 
• Provide security to vital installations, key points and foreign missions 
• Check smuggling of narcotics and contraband along the border of settled 
and tribal areas 
• Perform any other duty assigned by the government 
2. Strength/Organization 
The Frontier Constabulary is organized into platoons. There are 403 general 
duties platoons (43 personnel in each) along with the Headquarters which comes to 
approximately 20,000 men.126 The men are recruited from the border tribes of the 
NWFP. Recruitment for the Frontier Constabulary is entirely confined to the Pashtuns.127 
It is basically a preventive force and can be called upon to serve anywhere in Pakistan. 
This force does not have any dedicated agency for the provision of intelligence, and its 
                                                 
125 The historical account and the tasks of the Frontier Constabulary have been derived from the 
visitor’s brief of the organization and telephone talks of the author with (a) few officials of the Frontier 
Constabulary at Peshawar, Pakistan. After 9/11, the ineffectiveness of the Frontier Constabulary in dealing 
with terrorists was seriously exposed. Though this force is presently working with the Army and FC, its 




response on any crisis is mostly reactive rather than proactive. Administrative control lies 
with the Ministry of Interior, whereas operational control lies with the respective 
provinces where the Frontier Constabulary troops are deployed. Its budget comes from 
the Federal Government. 
3. Training and Deployment 
The Frontier Constabulary organizes training for its manpower at two schools, 
namely the Training School at Shabqadar and the Training Center at Swat.128 Both 
schools are inadequately equipped, understaffed and poorly structured for good quality 
training. The deployment pattern of the Frontier Constabulary varies with the law and 
order situation in the country. The present deployment is as follows. 
 
Location/Assignment Number of Platoons Remarks 
Islamabad 27 Protection of Official buildings 
NWFP 85 Working with provincial police 
Sind 75 Employed with Sind Rangers  
Balochistan 46 Working for the security of the 
area with the police and the 
Frontier Corps 
Multi National Companies 29 Supervising security 
FC Forts/Post 102 Available for additional duties 
Northern Areas  34 Employed with the Army  
Reserve/ Administration  5  
Total 403  
Table 3.   Deployment of Frontier Constabulary in year 2005129 
                                                 
128 The historical account and the tasks of the Frontier Constabulary have been derived from the 
visitor’s brief of the organization and telephone talks of the author with (a) few officials of the Frontier 
Constabulary at Peshawar, Pakistan. After 9/11, the ineffectiveness of the Frontier Constabulary in dealing 
with terrorists was seriously exposed. Though this force is presently working with the Army and FC, its 
role in the overall campaign of counter terrorism in the country is quite marginalized.   
129 Most of the platoons of the Frontier Constabulary are deployed in conjunction with other LEAs 
because of their low level of operational preparedness. Very rarely this force is assigned with any important 
task independently. 
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4. Weapons/Equipment and Communication 
The Frontier Constabulary has neither specialized equipment nor heavy weapons. 
It uses no heavy or specialized vehicles, and operates only with normal light vehicles. It 
has no armored personnel carriers or artillery support to provide direct or indirect fire 
power.130 The Frontier Constabulary has a limited wireless network facility linked to its 
various units. In fact, all the districts are connected through phone lines. Technologically, 
the force is backward and hardly uses any advancements of this filed in its functioning. 
Recently, a few computers have been provided for better record keeping, but they are 
insufficient to meet even their minimal requirements.  
D. LEVIES 
1. Origin and Organization 
Levies are a community police raised amongst local tribes in the Balochistan 
Province, and controlling law and order in “B” areas131 as a substitute for the police in 
other parts of the country.132 This force takes its originated in the British era, when a 
Federal Levies Force was raised through administrative reforms introduced by Sher Shah 
Soori. Under this arrangement, the local tribes and elders were responsible for the law 
and order situation within their respective territorial and tribal jurisdictions. After the 
abolition of the tribal states’ system in 1958, the Levies were made a provincial force and 




                                                 
130 Visitor’s brief, Frontier Constabulary. 
131 The districts of the Balochistan Province are divided into A and B Areas. Presently, twenty two 
districts of the Province make up the A areas while remaining five are B areas. The responsibility of 
maintaining law and order in A areas rests with the provincial police department, whereas Levies have the 
responsibility to maintain law and order in B areas.   
132 Malik Siraj Akbar, “More Crime in Police- Controlled Areas in Balochistan,” Daily Times, July 
11, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C11%5Cstory_11-7-
2007_pg7_13 (accessed October 7, 2008).  
 51
the police under the regular laws. The process of merging the Levies with the regular 
police is gradually making headway. Presently, only five districts in the country come 
under Levies. Some of the organizational aspects are as follows.133 
1. Total strength - 4200 approximately 
2. Number of Levies’ Districts - 5 
3. Number of Levies’ Police Stations - 42 
4. Levies Posts & Piquet - 70 
2. Tasks134 
Levies are presently performing following tasks. 
• Maintain law and order in “B” areas of Balochistan Province 
• Watch and ward functions, detection, prevention and apprehension of 
crime 
• Investigation and prosecution of criminals and Highway Security 
• Protect strategic installations, key points, and vulnerable areas 
• Escort official (local and foreign) dignitaries 
3. Functional Inadequacies 
This force is the weakest of all LEAs in the country as it does not possess the 
requisite quality of manpower, or sufficient weapons, equipment, vehicles or funding.135 
Its inadequate weaponry includes old versions of KK rifles, light machine guns, G-3 
rifles, and pistols with an insufficient supply of ammunition for training and operations.  
 
 
                                                 
133 The data is based upon some of the discussions of the author with the Levies Officials in 
Balochistan.  
134 Tasks of the Levies are almost same as of the police, but they have a different uniform, culture and 
way of working. The Pakistani Government started merging this force into the police during 2003 with an 
objective to eliminate Levies and organize the police in all parts of the Province. The process is still 
continuing; however, it has seriously slowed down after the Musharraf Government.   
135 Siraj Akbar, “More Crime in Police- Controlled Areas in Balochistan,” Daily Times, July 11, 2007, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C11%5Cstory_11-7-2007_pg7_13 
(accessed October 7, 2008).  
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No formal training center exists for personnel of Levies in the country. After rudimentary 
initial training or on the job training, the only opportunity to train the Levies’ manpower 
comes from rare vacancies at the training institutions of the Army and police. 
The automobiles of the force are limited and include a few pickups, ambulances, 
trucks and motorcycles. In most cases, the manpower of the Levies hires vehicles to reach 
incident sites. The communication infrastructure of the force is equally feeble. It depends 
upon very old and defective HF wireless sets, walkie-talkies, and a few line phones. 
E. CIVIL ARMED FORCES (CAF) 
In addition to the various police forces under direct control of the Provincial 
governments, Pakistan has a well organized set of CAF in the country. They are also 
known as paramilitary forces. They are organized under the control of Interior Ministry at 
Federal level, but operationally deployed and administered in their respective 
provinces.136 These forces patrol the borders in their respective areas of responsibility, 
maintain law and order in the country, and act in response to all catastrophes and 
emergent situations. Presently, the CAF of the country includes the following major 
forces, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs. 
1. Pakistan Rangers Punjab 
Sind 
2. Frontier Corps North Western Frontier Province 
Balochistan 
3. Pakistan Coast Guards Coastal Belt of Pakistan      
F. PAKISTAN RANGERS 
The Pakistan Rangers are a federally administered force for protecting the eastern 
borders of Pakistan during times of peace.137 They assist the Punjab and Sind provinces 
with the maintenance of law and order. After their creation in 1948, the Pakistan Rangers 
                                                 
136 Pakistan Reality, “Pakistan Paramilitary Forces,” http://www.pakreality.com/military/pakistan-
paramilitary-forces/ (accessed October 23, 2008). 
137 Pakistani Armed Forces, “Pakistan Rangers,” 
http://www.pakistanidefence.com/PakParamilitary/PakistanRangers.htm (accessed October 7, 2008). 
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were acting as one force for the entire eastern border of Pakistan.138 However, in March 
1993, they were divided into two separate forces as the Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) and 
the Pakistan Rangers (Sind). With the current arrangement, they operate within the 
boundaries of their respective provinces, unless the Federal Government needs their 
services anywhere else.   
1. Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) 
a. Tasks 
Following are a few of the significant tasks assigned to the Pakistan 
Rangers (Punjab).139 
• Defense of the eastern borders of the country in peace time. They come 
under operational control of the Army during war. 
• Internal security duties both with and without the police force for the 
maintenance of law and order in the Punjab province140 
• Back-up support for the police and participation in joint large scale search 
and sweep operations against criminals 
• Security in areas around the hilly ranges where the police force is not 
deployed 
• Act as a large back-up reserve to be deployed in case of large scale 
disorder or rioting within their area of responsibility or elsewhere 
• While functioning in support of the police, Rangers take over certain areas 
where the situation is more critical, and they conduct independent 
operations using their own intelligence network141 
b. Strength and Deployment 
This force, comprised of approximately 20,000 personnel, who are 
organized into four Rangers Corps, is tasked to defend about 1300 kilometers along the 
                                                 
138 Pakistani Armed Forces, “Pakistan Rangers,” 
http://www.pakistanidefence.com/PakParamilitary/PakistanRangers.htm (accessed October 7, 2008). 
139 Ibid. 
140 “Pakistan Army, Rangers, Police Provide Security to Ashura Procession,” Pakistan Times, 
http://pakistantimes.net/2008/01/21/top5.htm (accessed October 8, 2008).  
141 Ibid. 
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border in peace time and help maintain law and order as required within Punjab and 
Islamabad.142 The bulk of the officers of this force come from the Army on deputation 
for tenure of 2-3 years. The present deployment of these corps is as given below. 
 











Marala, Maharajke, Shakargarh, 










325 Kilometers  
Sulemanki, Bahawalnagar, Fort 






Khanpur, Rahim Yar Khan and 
Sadiqabad 
Table 4.   Deployment of various units of Pakistan Rangers (Punjab)144 
In the wake of the security situation in the country, the Punjab Rangers 
have formed three additional Internal Security Wings, which will be committed to  
 
 
                                                 
142 The information about the strength and responsibilities of the Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) has been 
procured from the telephone conversions of the author with officials of the force at their Headquarters in 
Lahore. However, this force is increasing its manpower due to its enhanced and frequent employment 
against terrorists in different parts of the country. For the first time, this force has enrolled female officers 
and soldiers and 60 of them passed out on October 25, 2008 after successful initial training.  
143 These wings of Pakistan Rangers are based in villages as shown in the table and mostly their areas 
of responsibility lie around those villages. They can readily react to any security situation within the area of 
their jurisdiction.  
144 These are the standard deployment positions of various wings of the Pakistan Rangers. However, 
depending upon the severity of the situation in different locations along the border or within the country, 
the deployment can be easily varied, and that has been a common phenomenon in the recent past.  
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maintaining law and order in the province.145 This force, exclusively organized, 
equipped, and trained to fight internal security issues, is likely to be much more effective 
against terrorists than the conventional border patrol Rangers.  
c. Weapons, Equipment and Communication 
The Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) are a fairly well organized force with 
sufficient weapons, equipment and communication networks. In order to make the 
Rangers a real front line force ready for the present day challenges and emerging 
operational trends, a three year program, “Enhancement of Combat Efficiency (2002-
2005)” has been completed.146 The force has been provided with a new weapons system 
comparable to the regular infantry formation of the Army. Some of the new equipment 
includes sniper rifles, laser range finders, global positioning systems, night vision 
goggles, bullet proof jackets, metal detectors, walk-through security gates, new vehicles 
and communication equipment. 
d. Training 
All ranks of the force undergo basic training at the Pakistan Rangers 
Academy, and some of them are subsequently trained through courses and cadres run at 
Army institutions. In addition to routine training, the personnel of the Pakistan Rangers 
are being trained in anti-terrorist and commando courses at the Lahore Headquarters of 
the force. The anti-terrorist training focuses on following areas.147 
• Fighting in built up areas and the clearance of urban terrorists’ dens 
• Special training in conducting raids, ambushes 
• Patrolling and survival skills in inhospitable and remote areas 
                                                 
145 Peter R. Blood, “ Pakistan: A Country Study,” 
http://books.google.com/books?id=DRMTO7mn7hIC&pg=PA289&lpg=PA289&dq=intrenal+security+wi
ngs+of+pakistan+rangers&source=bl&ots=ScDg0czfBR&sig=Aa0A86L4_AJ7jnv_4P5pkYcXmAc&hl=en
&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result#PPA290,M1 (accessed October 23, 2008). 
146 Information based on discussions with Rangers Headquarters, Lahore. 
147 “Nation’s Support Vital for Success against Terrorism,” Associated Press of Pakistan, October 25, 
2008, http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=56905&Itemid=2 
(accessed October 27, 2008). 
 56
• Unarmed combat and rappelling 
• Hostage rescue techniques 
• Bomb disposal and the handling of IEDs 
• Counter measures to the latest terrorists’ techniques 
2. Pakistan Rangers (Sind) 
The Pakistan Rangers (Sind guard the 912 kilometers of International Border with 
India and are actively involved in combating terrorism and ensuring law and order by 
providing intimate support to Sind Police in Karachi, Interior Sind, in Gilgit, Balochistan 
and overseas under United Nation Missions.148 
a. Role and Tasks 
Conventionally, this force undertakes tasks similar to the Pakistan Rangers 
(Punjab) However, regarding Internal Security; the Sind Rangers are presently employed 
in following duties in the Sind Province.149 
• Patrolling Indus and National Highway in cases of emergencies 
• Providing back-up support to the provincial police for all large scale 
search and sweep operations and participate in such operations, whenever 
required 
• Deployment, at random, for the manning of protective bunds on the Indus 
River in areas where the police need back-up support 
• Availability as a reserve in case of large scale disorder and rioting in 
Karachi 
• Independent operations based on their own intelligence network 
 
                                                 
148 Syed Ejaz Ahmed Shah, “Winning Accolades for Role in Peace Keeping Operations,” Daily Mail, 
http://dailymailnews.com/200606/14/dmarticlepage.html (accessed October 24, 2008).  
149 “Sind Rangers Asked to Assist Police in Law Enforcement,” The Nation, July 6, 2008, 
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/Karachi/06-Jul-
2008/Sindh-Rangers-asked-to-assist-police-in-law-enforcement (accessed October 23, 2008). 
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b. Strength and Deployment 
The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) have and approximate strength of 25000 
personnel including their officers from the Pakistan Army, who continuously rotate on 
deputation to Rangers. The present deployment of various components of Pakistan 
Rangers (Sind) is as follows. 
 
a.  Rangers Headquarters  Location 
 (1) Thar Rangers Hyderabad 
 (2) Shahbaz Rangers Sukkur 
 (3) Bhittai Rangers Karachi 
 (4) Qasim Rangers Hyderabad 
 (5) Sachal Rangers Karachi 
 (6) Indus Rangers Nawabshah 
 (7) Abdullah Shah Ghazi Rangers Karachi 
b. 1 x Field Security Wing Sind Province 
c. 1 x Training Center & School Karachi 
d. Central Record Office Karachi  
e. Headquarters Wing Karachi  
f. 1 x Rangers Anti Terrorist Company150 Karachi 
g. 1 x Dolphin Company (Coastal Area Force) Badin 
h. 1 x Motor Cycle Company Karachi  
j. 1 x Special Equipment Company Karachi 
Table 5.   Deployment of various units of Pakistan Rangers (Sind) 
                                                 
150 The Anti Terrorist Company was raised to deal exclusively with terrorists, but with the increased 
number of terrorist activities and the need to protect the important official installations and personalities in 
Karachi and other big cities of the Province, the other wings of the Rangers are also frequently employed in 
anti terrorist role. More can be read about the employment of the Pakistan Rangers (Sind) for law and order 
maintenance at http://server.kbri-
islamabad.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3338&Itemid=43 (accessed October 23, 
2008). 
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In the wake of ongoing operations against sub-nationalists in the 
Balochistan Province, the strength of the already employed force on inter-province border 
has been increased to monitor the movement and activities of miscreants. The Pakistan 
Rangers (Sind) also play a significant role in the resettlement of displaced tribes in the 
troubled areas. The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) has continuously enhanced its anti-terrorist 
component since 2001. They have raised an anti-terrorist company with high-quality 
commando skills, which has been trained by the Special Services Group of the Pakistan 
Army. This company has also participated in exercises with the United Kingdom’s 
Special Air Services troops in Karachi. 
The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) presently perform major internal security 
duties in the province. They are provide security to high value installations, including the 
Keamari Oil Terminal, Karachi Port Trust, Pakistan Steel Mill and a large number of 
foreign consulates, gas exploration companies and important hotels. They provide 
protection for various government and non-government organizations, major educational 
institutions, and mega events held in Karachi, and visiting foreign dignitaries. They also 
protect Karachi City, super and national highways with extensive mobile patrolling. The 
Pakistan Rangers (Sind) are also monitoring the canals to stop water theft and ensure fair 
distribution of irrigation water to the tail users. 
c. Weapons, Equipment, Communication and Training 
The Pakistan Rangers (Sind) are provided the same weapons and 
equipment as the Rangers in Punjab. Their up-gradation plan for communication is also 
identical. Similarly, their training level, emphasis on counter terrorism proficiency for 
manpower, and overall operational efficiency both in peace and war are almost the same 
(as discussed in the preceding paragraphs). 
G. FRONTIER CORPS  
The Frontier Corps (FC) was created as an organized and autonomous LEA in 
1907 by combining the already existent seven scouts and militia units in the tribal areas 
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of the United India.151 Initially, this force was employed to monitor the movement across 
Durand Line. Though more units were added into the organization since its inception, it 
continued its initial role even after the independence of Pakistan. However, its continuous 
growth and responsibility, spread over 2500 miles of inhospitable terrain, led the force to 
split into two province based groups in 1973, namely FC NWFP and FC Balochistan.152 
Presently, both independent forces fall under the ambit of the Interior Ministry, are 
financed by the Federal Government of Pakistan, and are placed under provincial 
Governors to undertake internal security duties within their respective provinces.  
1. FC NWFP 
a. Tasks of the Force 
FC NWFP is responsible for border defense duties on the north western 
and western borders of Pakistan.153 They are a well organized force comprised of men 
from tribes living in the NWFP and Balochistan provinces. The mission given to the FC 
NWFP combines both peacetime and war time functions. The mission of the force 
includes the following. 
• Protect and provide surveillance of the Pak-Afghan border within the 
boundary of the NWFP province including the FATA areas 
• Maintain law and order in the tribal territory of the NWFP and the FATA 
• Assist the civil administration with internal security duties 
• Perform specific tasks including anti smuggling operations and the 
security of routes 
• Come under Army command during war or emergency 
                                                 
151 Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier Corps,” March 29, 2007, 




b. Organization of the Force 
The FC NWFP, with its headquarters at Peshawar, is organized into corps 
and wings based in important areas along the Pak-Afghan borders. Each corps is 
commanded by a Colonel, who is directly responsible to the Inspector General (IG) of the 
FC. The IG, who is an army major general, answers to the Interior Ministry in Islamabad. 
Presently, the FC NWFP is comprised of eleven corps, each with thirty four rifle wings. 
The names of the corps generally represent their areas of responsibility in the FATA and 
the NWFP province. The force is split into the following corps. 
• Chitral Scouts 
• Dir Scouts 
• Bajaur Scouts 
• Mohmand Rifles 
• Khyber Rifles 
• Mahsud Scouts 
• Kurram Militia 
• Thal Scouts 
• Shawal Rifles 
• Tochi Scouts 
• South Waziristan Scouts 
c. Operational Efficiency 
The FC NWFP is equipped with a fairly good number of aged weapons, 
equipment and communication assets and operates as a self-sufficient organization.154 
The force has its own training school, with a limited infrastructure and allied facilities. 
Before 9/11, the training of manpower was mainly focused on peace time security duties 
along friendly borders. However, in recent years, the emphasis has taken a paradigmatic 
shift towards training for anti terrorist activities. Presently, almost the entire force is  
 
                                                 
154 Embassy of the United States, “U.S. Delivers Protective Equipment to Frontier Corps NWFP,” 
December 5, 2006, http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h06120501.html (accessed October 12, 2008). 
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employed with the Pakistan military in anti- terrorist activities on the Pak-Afghan 
borders.155 Initially, the performance of the force was quite deplorable; however, their 
performance is continuously improving.156  
2. FC Balochistan 
The FC Balochistan, with its Headquarters at Quetta, consists of about 50,000 
personnel, and falls under the domain of the Federal government. Its corps and wings are 
based and deployed in almost all parts of the Balochistan Province. They guard against 
anti-state and criminal activities, smuggling, and human trafficking along the Pak-Iran 
and Pak-Afghan borders.157 This force has been engaged more than few times in 
government’s attempts to eliminate tribal and sub- nationalist counter agencies in the 
province.     
a. Tasks of FC Balochistan 
A few of the significant tasks of FC Balochistan are as follows. 
• Guarding 2100 kilometers of the Pak-Afghan and Pak-Iran borders to 
protect movement of smugglers/unwanted local and foreign personnel 
• Assisting the provincial government maintain civil power in the face of 
sub-nationalist threats, ethnic, tribal sectarian and economic disputes 
• Protecting gas plants in the province like Sui, Pirkoh, Loti, Uch and mega 
projects, and providing security to foreign construction teams 
• Protecting and securing 2900 kilometers of communication lines including 
national highways and the main railway link 
• Checking and controlling human traffic along the borders 
• Running anti-smuggling, anti-narcotics and anti-gun running operations 
                                                 
155 “Over 1500 Militants Killed, 950 Arrested in Bajaur Operation,” Associated Press of Pakistan, 
http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=56920&Itemid=2 (accessed 
October 5, 2008). 
156 Inspector General FC NWFP, Major General Tariq Khan, had a press conference on October 24, 
2008 where he presented a commendable role played by FC troops while undertaking tough operations in 
the Bajaur Agency of the FATA. This agency appears to be under full control of the security forces of 
Pakistan, which is a big blow for the militants and a significant achievement for the FC troops deployed 
there.  
157 “No Military Operation is Going on in Balochistan,” Daily Gujranwala Times, August 3, 2008, 
http://gujranwalatimes.com/english/modules/news/article.php?storyid=93 (accessed October 25, 2008).  
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b. Deployment and Commitment Profile 
Presently, seven of the fourteen corps of the FC Balochistan are deployed 
to monitor the borders. They are manning approximately 400 check posts. Six Corps are 
deployed in the interior areas of the Balochistan Province to maintain law and order and 
help the police and the Levies establish the writ of the state. They are also employed to 
maintain lines of communication and ensure the protection of development projects 
within the province.158 The reserve corps looks after the administrative needs of the force 
and acts as a stand-by reserve to reinforce any of the deployed corps during emergencies. 
c. Weapons, Equipment, and Training 
This force holds an almost identical quantity and quality of weapons, 
operational equipment and communication assets as the FC NWFP.159 However, a lot of 
new equipment and vehicles have been procured recently, which enhances the overall 
operational efficiency of the FC Balochistan. Similarly, over the past several years, on the 
job training against criminals, terrorists, and sub-nationalists has contributed to the 
improvement of the individual and collective skills of the troops.  
H. PAKISTANI COAST GUARDS 
The Pakistani Coast Guard looks after the coastal belt of Pakistan. The country 
has 650 miles of coastline falling in its Sind and Balochistan Provinces. The coastline 
borders the Northeastern Arabian Sea. The Exclusive Economic Zone covers an area of 
196, 600 square kilometers, and the territorial waters stretch over 24000 square 
kilometers.160  
                                                 
158 Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier Corps,” March 29, 2007, 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370292 (accessed October 3, 2008). 
159 Ibid. 
160 Wildlife of Pakistan, “Introduction to Pakistan,” 




Figure 7.   Map showing coastline of Pakistan161 
Prior to 1971, Pakistan had no organized agency to ensure the protection of her 
coastline against smugglers, saboteurs and illegal immigrants, and the vast coastal belt of 
the country was exposed to any sort of threat. A very small number of personnel, in an 
insignificant official agency, “Sea Customs,” were hardly able to make their presence 
felt, let alone counter well equipped and armed smugglers. Therefore, the Pakistani Coast 
Guard was set up in June 1971 at Karachi. Since then, this force, headed by its Director 
General- a brigadier from the Army on deputation – has improved the performance of its 
duties to safeguard the coastal belt of the country.162  
The Pakistani Coast Guard, which is a federal LEA, works in modest 
collaboration with the Pakistan Navy, the FC Balochistan and local police to prevent the 
smuggling of illegal goods and narcotics, stop illegal immigration to and migration from 
the country, and stop enemy agents or saboteurs from infiltrating the country along the 
coastal areas. The significance of the Pakistani Coast Guard has dramatically increased in 
today’s situation of rising terrorism in the country. 
                                                 
161 Wildlife of Pakistan, “Introduction to Pakistan,” 
http://www.wildlifeofpakistan.com/IntroductiontoPakistan/coastlineofPakistan.htm (accessed October 2, 
2008). 
162 “Encyclopedia: Pakistan Coast Guard,” NationMaster.com, 
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Pakistan-Coast-Guard (accessed September 23, 2008). 
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Despite having been deployed on a long coast for more than thirty five years, the 
Pakistani Coast Guard has serious operational limitations. The force has a severe scarcity 
of well trained manpower, and the lack the latest weapons and equipment to match the 
smugglers. This especially affects their capability during night operations. Similarly, a 
limited number of vehicles and an obsolete communication infrastructure further reduce 
the combat worthiness of the Pakistani Coast Guard. 
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented a brief account of the LEAs in Pakistan with special 
emphasis upon their strength, organization, training, and operational capabilities. 
Pakistan has a fairly significant number of LEAs deployed in all parts of the country. 
Each could invariably deal with small security situations in their areas of responsibility 
with their existing structures and organizational state of affairs. Perhaps, this was one of 
the major reasons that the administrations of Pakistan always felt complacent and never 
critically evaluated the operational discrepancies in the LEAs of the country. The present 
wave of terrorism and the inability of the LEAs to maintain law and order in different 
parts of the country have exposed many of their limitations and shortfalls, which will be 
critically highlighted in the following chapter. Improving upon the vast existing 
infrastructure of the LEAs and addressing the weaknesses in their structure can enhance 
their efficiency significantly, and enable them to confront the menace of terrorism in 
Pakistan.   
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V. PAKISTAN LEAS -AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The LEAs of Pakistan- an apparently strong looking group of forces- have 
generally been able to manage the law and order situation in the country since its 
creation. In difficult situations, when dealing with insurgent and sub-nationalist elements 
in Sind and Balochistan Provinces or responding to various catastrophes in the country, 
they have often been reinforced by the military to satisfactorily perform the necessary 
tasks. With this sort of tranquil arrangement in the country without the state’s 
interference into trouble spots like the FATA, the various governments of Pakistan 
invariably felt satisfied with the performance of the LEAs. In addition, there has been the 
occasional up-gradation of the LEAs. Certainly, none of these sporadic ventures can be 
viewed as a resolute effort to make the LEAs a compatible force to fight terrorism, and 
this was never among the priorities of the decision makers in the country. 
Before the current surge of terrorism in the country, which started after 9/11, 
Pakistani LEAs were never confronted with such a daunting task of maintaining law and 
order. The artificial satisfaction with the performance of LEAs has gained more exposure 
with every passing day during the counter terrorism campaign in the country. This 
doomsday scenario, which has made Pakistan a security risk, demands serious review of 
the performance of all LEAs in the country. This will enable the creation of a 
comprehensive plan to improve the efficiency of Pakistan’s LEAs in their future efforts 
against terrorism. 
B. OUTLOOK OF THE CHALLENGE 
The LEAs of Pakistan are confronted with the gigantic challenge of countering 
robust, innovative, unconventional, and faceless terrorists in their country. The present 
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terrorism has demonstrated its ability to network globally by launching terrorist 
operations against the U.S. and its allies from a score of countries with local support.163  
The terrorists employ many sophisticated methods of operation, using local 
criminal networks, narcotics gangs, and networks of arms traffickers. They are 
technologically savvy and train for their missions like aspiring technologists.164 The 
world’s hunger for instant news on the global TV networks has provided a wide domain 
for terrorists to propagate their beliefs and wage psychological warfare. Interestingly, 
terrorists, despite their religious zeal, have exhibited out of the box thinking in the 
selection of targets, choice of venues, use of technology and method of operations.  
C. IMPLICATIONS ON LEAS 
The deteriorating law and order situation and continuous rise of terrorist activities 
in the country has serious implications for Pakistan’s LEAs. In the near future, these 
forces will have to operate under the following scenario. 
• The writ of the state remains diluted showing marginal improvement. This 
places more pressure on the LEAs to overcome the menace of terrorism. 
• The overall law and order situation in the country, especially in the NWFP 
and Balochistan Provinces, along with the scarcity of funding will remain 
an area of concern for the LEAs; thus, the challenges posed to LEAs will 
continue for a reasonably long time.165 
• Weak governance, including rampant corruption, prevailing nepotism and 
a lack of accountability in the organizational system of the LEAs, will 
increase complications for improvement of these forces.166 
• The lethal combination of sophistication and ingenuity used by the 
terrorists for their nefarious acts is a widespread phenomenon, and LEAs 
will continue to face stiff challenges and security risks. 
                                                 
163 Michel Chossudovsky, “Pakistan and the Global War on Terrorism,” January 8, 2008, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7746 (accessed September 2, 2008). 
164 Gabriel Weimann, “How Modern Terrorist Uses the Internet,” 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.pdf (accessed September 14, 2008).  
165 Lisa Curtis, “Combating Terrorism in Pakistan: Going on the Offensive,” July 15, 2008, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1991.cfm (accessed October 3, 2008).  
166 Transparency International, “Pakistan National Corruption Perception Survey 2006,” August 11, 
2006, 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&ct=result&cd=1&q=corruption+in+Pa
kistan+Police&spell=1 (accessed October 12, 2008). 
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• The provision of secure environments for developmental activities and the 
rebuilding of infrastructure in the trouble zones, particularly less governed 
areas like the FATA are likely to remain major areas of concern for the 
LEAs. 
• The integration of the three principal LEAs, namely the FC, Rangers, and 
police to affect the writ of the state remains questionable as these three 
forces have different operational cultures and do not fall under a unified 
command mechanism. 
• The Army plays a key stabilizing role in the country through its strong 
positioning and posturing. In the past, they have been repeatedly employed 
in an internal security mode to quell uprisings and troubles. The lead role 
of the Army appears to be continuing, thus hampering the confidence and 
self-reliance of the LEAs to deal with difficult situations. 
D. AN INVESTIGATIVE VIEW OF THE LEAS 
The LEAs of Pakistan are functioning within an age old system based on a time 
when their tasks were less challenging.167 Today, with the threat scenario transformed 
and their employment more exigent, their organization, training standards, weapons and 
equipment are not adequate to meet the new demands. The subsequent paragraphs briefly 
highlight some of the major issues, which need a re-appraisal for the judicious and 
successful employment of the Pakistan’s LEAs in the days to come. 
1. Organizational Contours 
a. Faulty Infrastructure 
The existing infrastructure of each LEA is strictly hierarchical and rigid 
with no interagency collaboration.168 The information and intelligence collected by one 
LEA is not shared with any other, and all of them operate in near isolation. This lack of 
cooperation results in slower, less effective responses to terrorist and criminal activities. 
Within each LEA, independent teamwork is not emphasized and a sluggish bureaucracy 
is dominant, which creates a less than prompt response to emergencies.       
                                                 
167 Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, “Reforming Pakistan Police: An Overview,” 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008). 
168 Ibid. 
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b. Deficiency of Manpower 
Almost all LEAs are deficient in their authorized manpower and perform 
their duties with limited personnel. The increasing population, rapidly growing cities and 
more frequent occurrence of terrorist activities in all parts of the country have made the 
tasks of the LEAs, especially the police, more challenging. The existing strength of the 
police, when compared to the large areas of responsibility deputed to each police station, 
is inadequate and at times laughable. Consequently, the role of the police is 
predominantly a reactive response rather than a proactive approach.169 
c. Shortage of Weapons and Equipment 
The terrorists have kept a reasonably good pace with technological 
advancements, whereas the LEAs of Pakistan have not. The police, Frontier Constabulary 
and Levies operate with old vintage rifles that cannot compete with the latest 
multipurpose weapons used by the terrorists.170 Some particular concerns include lack of 
close-quarter-battle weapons, bulletproof jackets, bomb disposal systems, armed 
personnel carriers, scanners, vehicle search apparatus, anti riot equipment, surveillance 
gear, forensic equipment, and IED jammers. 
d. Lack of Compatible Mobility and Transport 
In addition to the lack any aerial support for the LEAs of Pakistan, they 
also do not have a sufficient number of running vehicles, and this lack of mobility 
seriously hinders their smooth functioning. When speedy action is warranted based on 
reliable information about terrorists, the absence of requisite mobility foils the efforts of 
the LEAs. The following examples illustrate the seriousness of the situation. 
 
                                                 
169 “Pakistan Police Reforms,” Daily Times, June 14, 2007, 
http://pakistanpolicereforms.blogspot.com/2007/06/pakistan-police-reforms.html (accessed September 11, 
2008)  
170 James Bonomo, Giacomo Bergamo, David R. Flinger, John Gordon and Brian A. Jackson, 
“Steeling the Sword: Limiting Terrorists Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons,” 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG510.pdf (accessed October 12, 2008).  
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• Each police station in the country, which is responsible for maintaining 
law and order in an area of up to 100 villages, has one or two official 
vehicles.171 If one team has left the police station, the other teams are 
forced to wait for the return of the vehicle, irrespective of the urgency of 
the situation. Alternatively, the victim of the crime must hire a vehicle for 
to bring the police to the site of the incident.  
• An FC wing (600 personnel) is authorized only 10 vehicles for operational 
tasks, logistics, and communication; therefore it impossible to meet all 
requirements at one time. 
• At present, most of the FC and Rangers check posts do not have any 
means of transportation. Every time a vehicle is required, it must come 
from another place. This acute deficiency of vehicles makes them 
ineffective against highly mobile terrorists. 
• No LEA has a reserve or second line transport to replace their faulty 
vehicles. Since the vehicles are old and spare parts are unavailable, 
breakdowns are common. 
• All LEAs hold negligible number of special vehicles like ambulances and 
shop vans. Therefore when combating terrorist activity, they need to hire 
or illegally force a civilian ambulance to help the victims. 
e. Shortage of Communication and Surveillance Equipment 
Most of the communication equipment held by the LEAs are outdated and 
do not work efficiently. Unsecured wireless communication often reveals the plans of the 
LEAs to terrorists, and unprotected line communication can be cut by the terrorists at any 
time. Similarly, the shortage of surveillance equipment within the LEAs poses serious 
problems. It facilitates the movement of terrorists into sensitive areas, and allows them to 
cross borders undetected. However, the United States is in the process of providing some 
surveillance equipment for the LEAs of Pakistan.172  
                                                 
171 The author had a telephone conversation with police officials from seven police stations in District 
Gujarat, located on the main highway in central Punjab. All but two have only one vehicle. The two with 
more vehicles appeared to be privileged to have more moving capability than their counter parts in the 
District. Some of the police stations in remote areas of the country do not have any official vehicles 
available to them for duty.    
172 “U.S. to Give Security Equipment to Pakistan,” Dawn, 
http://www.dawn.com/2004/09/17/nat19.htm (accessed October 24, 2008). 
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f. Revision of Tables of Organization and Equipment 
The Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&Es)173 officially 
represent the authorization of manpower, weaponry and equipment for each security 
organization in Pakistan. These are gravely outdated and need revision to make 
permanent changes in the authorization of these forces. Some of the LEAs have procured 
items and equipment outside their TO&Es through different government and 
nongovernment programs. This makes the organizations dependent on “adhocism.” There 
is a need to revise the TO&Es according to the changed scenarios and environments.  
2. Training Inadequacies 
a. Lack of Specialized Training 
The LEAs do not have an appropriate system of specialized training for 
their manpower. For the most part, they learn through on job the training, which is really 
hard way to learn. Modern terrorists are very well trained, motivated and enjoy the 
advantages of initiative and invisibility. Thus, a wide gap of capability exists between the 
trained terrorists and the ill trained troops of the LEAs. This turns the tide in favor of the 
terrorists. 
b. Training versus Application 
Because of their traditional peace and war time roles, mostly along the 
borders, the personnel of the FC and Rangers do not prioritize their secondary task, which 
is to maintain law and order inside the cities and villages. Their training focuses on their 
duties along the borders. Once employed in a police role, they encounter serious 
problems adjusting to their new function. 
                                                 
173 The term is commonly used in Pakistan’s military, and as the paramilitary forces are mainly run by 
the army officers employed on deputation into these forces, this term is also commonly used among all 
ranks of the paramilitary forces. This table lays down the complete detail of the actual authorization of 
manpower, weapons and equipment to respective forces under different contingencies of operations.   
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c. Training Schools of LEAs 
The few poorly structured training schools of the police and CAFs are 
insufficient to train their manpower. As the terrorists target police training centers to 
damage the law enforcement mechanism, maintaining the security of the schools has 
further reduced the ability to provide adequate training.174 Moreover, the output of these 
schools remains questionable in the absence of sufficiently trained instructors and 
adequate training aids. Since there are very few vacancies allotted to each other’s 
schools, integrated training with operationally affiliated units is severely neglected. 
d. Anti Terrorist Training 
The LEAs do not have well organized anti-terrorist training centers of 
their own, and they are dependent upon the allotment of a few spaces in each course run 
at the Army’s anti-terrorists’ training complexes.175 Due to the extensive involvement of 
the Army in their counter terrorism campaign and the continuous training requirements 
for the task the LEAs are not allowed many spots in Army Courses. In addition, there has 
been no effort by the LEAs to utilize existing army centers for additional courses. 
Therefore, a lack of the requisite anti-terrorist training has adverse effects on the efficacy 
of the LEAs against terrorism in the country. 
                                                 
174 “Blasts Hit Pakistan Police School,” BBC News, May 11, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4760463.stm (accessed October 1, 2008).  
175 Pakistan Army has placed special emphasis upon antiterrorist training since 2001, and has 
developed at least one complex at each Garrison in the country to train its manpower before deployment 
into the troubled areas of the country. As the employment of the Army against terrorists in the country is 
over stretched and a large number of troops need to undergo the anti terrorist training, only few vacancies 
are offered to the LEAs in such courses. This is insufficient to meet their requirements for efficient 
operations against terrorism.   
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3. Operational Imbalances 
a. Integral Aviation Assets and Support 
Considering the complexity of the threat, difficult terrain configuration, 
and requirement for speedy movement, LEAs require at least minimal integral aviation 
assets, both combat as well as cargo. Presently, none has any such asset and each has to 
rely on the Army’s help for aerial support. 
b. Logistic System 
The LEAs operate their distribution of rations and supplies through badly 
managed contracts. This system often provides sub-standard supplies to the forces and 
fails to support the LEAs logistically during prolonged engagements. The system is not 
reliable and often becomes unworkable in the prevalent tense environment. This leaves 
the troops to manage their necessities on their own. In addition, the practice of procuring 
a widely dissimilar variety of vehicles, weapons, and equipment, without any long-term 
thinking about maintenance, needs to be replaced with an integrated recovery and 
maintenance system. 
c. Engineer Assets 
Presently, none of the LEAs has a worthwhile bomb disposal squad to 
handle the ever increasing number and variety of IEDs and bombs used by the 
terrorists.176 Often, the LEAs are dependent upon military engineer assets for the disposal 
of bombs and IEDs, which is not a smooth arrangement for a prompt response against 
security threats in the country. There is an increased need for independent engineering 
organizations within each LEA. Each one needs independent bomb disposal squads and 
explosive sections. 
                                                 
176 Terence J. Sigamony, “Civil Defense Bomb Disposal Squad without Latest Equipment,” Daily 
Times, October 15, 2008, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C10%5C15%5Cstory_15-10-2008_pg11_10 
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d. Intelligence and Scientific Means of Investigation 
The absence of an accurate and efficient intelligence system is a limitation 
for all the LEAs of Pakistan, because none has an independent and proficient intelligence 
unit. Most of them rely on Federal and Military Intelligence agencies like the Federal 
Investigation Agency, Inter Services Intelligence, or Military Intelligence Directorate. 
This is a complicated, laborious and sluggish process.177 This process limits the LEAs 
freedom to act and often proves counterproductive to their performance against terrorists. 
Additionally, at the moment, there is no forensic laboratory with any LEA, the lack of 
which makes scientific investigation a distant dream. Resultantly, investigations are 
conducted in an obsolete fashion without any great benefit to the cause of counter-
terrorism. 
e. Reinvigoration of Crisis Management Setup 
Presently, a crisis management organization exists each at provincial and 
national level, but these organizations are underutilized. There is no clear designation of 
their role as it relates to the LEAs. The true concept of the National Crises Management 
Cell (NCMC) is not yet geared up to contribute substantially in the overall crisis 
management in the country. This set-up is required to ensure interagency coordination 
based on a modern network centric system and to gain real time information for a 
requisite superior response. Unfortunately, it does not yet exist in the country. 
4. Unsatisfactory Work Environments and Functional Irritants 
a. Allocation of Budget 
The annual allocation of the budget for law enforcement, especially the 
police, Levies and Frontier Constabulary is too small to meet the very basic needs of the  
 
 
                                                 
177 Intelligence Resource Program, “Pakistan Intelligence Agencies,” 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/index.html (accessed October 29, 2008).  
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personnel, let alone provide for the modernization of these LEAs. Very low pay and the 
absence of basic benefits and ancillary services for the manpower of the LEAs are major 
causes of corruption and a lack of seriousness regarding duty. 
b. Morale and Motivation  
Morale is directly related to the output of the force. Amongst the LEAs, a 
1998 survey of 90 police officials conducted by a researcher of the Department of 
Sociology, University of the Punjab resulted in the following observations.178 
• 64.44% felt insecure about illegal transfer and / or suspension as a result 
of by political influence 
• 50% felt insecure about victimization from their superiors 
• 57.78% did not feel secure about their monthly salary 
• 57% did not feel secure about the provision of residential facilities 
• 47.78% felt insecure for the future of their children in case of any accident 
during professional performances 
• Majority of the respondents (52.22%) did not feel safe from the 
sophisticated weapons possessed by the criminals 
• 47.78% opined that there was no guarantee of proper legal action against 
the accused 
c. Frequent Posting and Shifting of Police Officials 
The shifting of police personnel for political reasons from one place to 
another has had deep effects on the performance of the organization. People with zeal and 
zest are often made to suffer and frequently rotated. On average, the tenure of an officer 
in Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukhur is 7, 5, and 4 months, respectively. The politicization 
of the police in other parts of the country also causes great damage to performance. 
                                                 
178 Though there has been no survey conducted lately on the police department of Pakistan, the living 
conditions of the police force have not improved much in the country. However, the quality of life of the 
troops in the Pakistan Rangers and Frontier Corps is improving. The survey data has been taken from the 
Visitor’s Brief of Sialkot Police.   
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d. Image Building 
The overall image of the LEAs in Pakistan has deteriorated over the years 
owing to their poor performance and unjust treatment of the public.179 The common 
citizens of the country do not have high expectations of these forces and are rarely 
willing to provide any information about the activities of terrorists and miscreants. 
Consequently, LEA operations get very little public support. Therefore, there is a dire 
need to improve the image of the LEAs. To garner willing support from the local 
populace for their operations, they must cast off their tarnished, ill-mannered, uncouth 
image and develop a public service oriented and people friendly outlook. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The LEAs of Pakistan face the daunting task of maintaining law and order in the 
country with meager resources and below par operational proficiencies. Traditionally, 
they have been trained to control riots or small disturbances and deal with minor security 
situations, which did not call for the massive use of force against their own people. 
However, the situation has changed since the influx of hard core, vigorously trained, and 
extremely radicalized foreign and local militants. These militants have access to 
sophisticated weaponry and lethal equipment that is far better than what the LEAs have. 
The country’s policy makers need to come out of their comfort zone of complacency 
about the structure of their LEAs and make rigorous efforts to modernize these forces. 
The well thought out restructuring and increased empowerment of the LEAs should be a 
priority in the country, so that unprecedented challenge of terrorism can be overcome. 
This terrorism is a hurdle to peacemaking not only within Pakistan, but also around the 
world. The subsequent chapter lays down some recommendations to enhance the combat 
worthiness of the LEAs in Pakistan.     
                                                 
179 Asghar Mahmood, “Police Occupational Culture,” Pakistan Times, 
http://pakistantimes.net/2004/02/16/guest1.htm (accessed October 19, 2008).  
 76
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 77
VI. RESPONSE PARAMETERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The complex and multifaceted manifestation of terrorism in Pakistan vis-à-vis the 
insubstantial security apparatus in the country in the form of feebly organized and 
scantily equipped/trained LEAs calls for a wide-ranging set of the recommendations to 
bolster the capabilities of the law enforcement mechanism in the country. At this crucial 
juncture in the history of the country, it is necessary for the Government of Pakistan to 
set a special priority for up-gradation of its LEAs. This will enable the country to 
generate a matching response to the despicable designs of the terrorist. This chapter first 
spells out the response parameters expected from the security mechanism in the country, 
and then suggests a course of action to build the capacity of the LEAs in Pakistan. 
B. RESPONSE PARAMETERS 
Any objective and dispassionate analysis of today’s terrorism in Pakistan suggests 
that it is neither a simple nor a short term affair, and it defies the pure use of force.180 
Political, psychological, economic and other initiatives are needed to supplement the use 
of force. There is a great need for more subtle tactics and special techniques of use of 
force coupled with politico-economic expertise instead of amassed fire power from 
conventional military forces.181 The vital prerequisites to conduct successful anti-terrorist 
operations call for a reinvigorated crisis management setup, coherent operational 
doctrine, and suitably organized LEAs capable of reacting across the entire spectrum of 
terrorism in all parts of the country. 
 
                                                 
180 Muhammad Khurshid, “Rule of Law Only Solution to Terrorism Problem in Tribal Areas,” 
American Chronicle, August 30, 2007, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/36414 (accessed 
October 30, 2008). 
181 Ibid. 
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To combat terrorism proactively, a cohesive and integrated intelligence effort at 
the national level is of the utmost importance, which demands due attention by the policy 
makers. On the execution end, a legal framework is required to be constituted to assist the 
LEAs in equipping and applying themselves for the initial containment and following 
elimination of terrorism in the country. Similarly, each LEA needs to devise a 
comprehensive training module to train its manpower for counterterrorist operations. This 
should be coordinated at national level to make the best use of the resources available for 
all the LEAs. 
C. NATIONAL RESPONSE 
Within its existing policy framework, it is imperative for the Government of 
Pakistan to evolve a national strategy to counter the looming menace of terrorism. The 
country has no option but to synchronize its political, economic, social, diplomatic, 
psychological and military assets for a sustained effort to win against the terrorists. At the 
national level, the following measures are suggested in this regard. 
1. Evolving National Anti Terrorist Policy 
Pakistan’s existing national defense policy, which is mainly focused on security 
along the eastern borders of the country, should be tailored to lay more emphasis on the 
threat of terrorism from local and foreign terrorists.182 The Defense Committee of the 
Cabinet (DCC)183 should regularly review terrorist threat scenarios and formulate 
policies accordingly. The policies should be comprised of short-term and long-term 
measures for the consolidation and up gradation of the capacity of security mechanisms 
in the country. 
                                                 
182 Ihsan Ahrari, “Pakistan’s Stakes in American War on Terrorism,” 
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pakistan.cfm (accessed November 9, 2008).  
183 Government of Pakistan, “Overview of the Cabinet Division,” 
http://202.83.164.26/wps/portal/Cabinet/!ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os_hQN68AZ3dnI
wML82BTAyNXTz9jE0NfQwNLE_2CbEdFACM6vXU!/ (accessed November 2, 2008). 
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2. Formulation of National Antiterrorist Strategy 
Based on the above mentioned national antiterrorist policy, an anti- terrorist 
strategy should be created at the national level. The strategy should focus on determining 
the threshold of terrorism in the country, allocating resources for infrastructure building 
to combat terrorism, and providing guidelines for Pakistan’s LEAs to plan and conduct 
antiterrorist operations. A continuous reappraisal of this strategy conducted by a group of 
think tanks organized under the DCC will help keep the LEAs geared up for their 
antiterrorist pursuits.    
3. Establishment of Internal Security (IS) Council 
The permanent institution of an IS Council at the National level can help 
continuously monitor and review the security situation in the country. It should adopt a 
proactive approach to identify the potential terrorist threats and take measures to 
eradicate them. The Council should act as the focal point of all LEAs for coordinating 
requisite manpower and resources, providing intelligence and guidelines for impending 
operations, synchronizing the efforts of various government bodies at national and 
provincial levels, assisting the DCC in policy formulation, and above all acting as the 
mother institution to plan and supervise the joint training of all LEAs, commensurate to 
threat and response required. The suggested composition of the council is as follows.  
• Chairman: Federal Secretary Interior 
• Members: Each province’s representative (Secretary Level) 
• A member each from the Ministries of Information, Interior and 
Foreign affairs 
• A representative from each of the LEAs 
• An officer each from the Army, Navy and Air Force 
• Two representatives from each intelligence agency 
• A representative each from the Judiciary and Media 
• A professional and learned analyst from each province, nominated 
by the executive head 
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4. Reinvigoration of Crises Management Setup 
The government needs to reinvigorate the National Crises Management Cell 
(NCMC)184 at a National level, under the IS Council. Provinces and districts can 
formulate such setups at their respective levels. These cells, if astutely instituted and 
aptly developed, can pay rich dividends when dealing with any crisis created by terrorist 
acts, through their swift and harmonious response. 
5. Acquisition and Processing of Intelligence 
The inability to acquire and process intelligence is a serious impediment to the 
proficient application of LEAs of Pakistan. The insightful and well planned management 
of intelligence and its coordination among various LEAs are vital for the success of any 
antiterrorist operation in Pakistan. This ought to be coordinated and synchronized at the 
highest level. A national intelligence organization, set up under the Ministry of Interior, 
should provide policy guidelines and establish antiterrorist intelligence and counter-
intelligence networks throughout the country. This set up can work in close coordination 
with Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)185 and other military intelligence agencies, 
whenever the military is required to reinforce the LEAs in antiterrorist operations. 
6. Political and Economic Stability 
The most important aspects of national integration in a democratic country are 
political and economic stability. The political and economic situation in Pakistan has yet 
to stabilize.186 Both of these components have a symbiotic relationship with the security 
situation in the country. The government must initiate immediate short-term and solid  
 
                                                 
184 The Cell exists at a national level, presently headed by Brigadier (Retired) Javed Iqbal Cheema, 
but it needs to focus more on the overall efficiency of the LEAs of Pakistan. Along with its reinvigoration 
as a potent institution to deal with all crises in the country, set ups should be established at each province 
level in close collaboration with the LEAs. At the moment, crisis cells are non-existent at the provincial 
level.  
185 Federation of American Scientists, “Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence,” 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/index.html (accessed November 3, 2008).  
186 Jackie Northam, “Economic, Political problems Rising in Pakistan,” All Things Considered, July 
25, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92928662 (accessed November 9, 2008).  
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long-term measures to improve upon the various institutions of the country. This will 
terminate the process of whimsical decision making by different personalities and address 
the root causes of the menace of terrorism. 
The parliament should constitute a comprehensive legal framework to assist the 
LEAs in combating terrorism. This will allow for decisions about the security situation 
that are dependent upon a defined constitutional process and not on the political 
expediency of various individuals or groups at the helm of affairs. 
7. Curbing Religious Radicalism and Sectarianism 
The government should promulgate constitutional rules and initiate administrative 
measures including the banning of religious extremist parties and their sympathizers. 
They should institute across the board registration and mainstreaming of madrassas to 
control the culture of sectarian hatred and religious violence. Similarly, a national 
strategy should be formulated for arms control and the disarmament of the civil 
population, including people in the tribal areas of the country. After the enactment of 
such rules, the LEAs should be facilitated to implement them vigorously without any 
political interference. 
8. Effective Use of Media 
The media should play a positive role in strengthening national security. The 
following aspects may help Pakistan effectively use the media to combat terrorism. 
The formation of a National Media Policy and orchestration of a workable media 
strategy with a precise focus on the war against terrorism. Presently, the media in 
Pakistan is mostly critical of the LEAs, and at times, in labyrinth, supports religious 
fundamentalists more than it guides the law enforcement mechanism of the country.187 
The media policy should endeavor to address such aspects, while taking freedom of 
speech into consideration.  
                                                 
187 Kenneth Ballen, “The Myth of Muslim Support for Terror,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
February 23, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html (accessed October 3, 2008).  
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The establishment of an expert group of competent and broad minded defense 
analysts, moderate religious specialists, and unprejudiced correspondents to monitor 
media coverage and respond to any extreme interpretation of the terrorists. This will 
ensure a professional approach to the coverage of the terrorists’ acts and the response of 
LEAs in such situations.188 
Pakistan should acquire a time and place in the international media to present the 
correct perspective of the situation in the country, highlight capacity problems of the 
LEAs, which are often mistaken as an unwillingness to tackle terrorism, and obliterate 
the doomsday picture painting of the security situation in the country. This will both 
discourage potential foreign terrorists who plan to travel to Pakistan, and encourage the 
LEAs of the country to take a more aggressive response against the terrorists.  
D. ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE – EXECUTION END 
1. Anti Terrorist Doctrine 
The National Management Crisis Cell should formulate a comprehensive 
antiterrorist doctrine, which should clearly state procedures for anti-terrorist operations in 
the country. Based on the doctrine, training publications should be prepared by the 
respective LEAs. These will provide guidelines for antiterrorist operations. To develop 
the doctrine, the following measures are recommended. 
The doctrine should be created at national level based on available assets and 
prospective capacity of all LEAs of the country, both at national and provincial levels. 
This should lay down a system of mutual support among all LEAs while employed in any 
part of the country.  
All stake holders - the Federal Government, the Provincial governments, and the 
LEAs should be involved in the preparation of this doctrine. Similarly, the role of the 
military in the maintenance of security should also be streamlined as a reinforcing force 
to the LEAs in extreme cases. 
                                                 
188 Pakistan Think Tank Forum, “What is the Reaction of Moderate Muslims to Terrorism,” January 
1, 2007, http://pakistanthinktank.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=121 (accessed October 12, 2008). 
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The overall responsibility of coordinating and implementing the above plan 
should be permanently entrusted to one agency, the IS Council/Ministry of Interior.189 
The present and near future terrorism situations should be studied in more detail 
to project the threat contours more clearly and identify the center of gravity of terrorism 
in each potentially troubled area. 
2. Antiterrorism Training Aspects 
a. Training Philosophy 
As identified earlier in the evaluation of the LEAs, what follows are three 
cardinal aspects on which the training philosophy of the LEAs of Pakistan should be 
based within the overall realm of the anti terrorist doctrine. 
• Restore the confidence and credibility of all ranks of the LEAs in order to 
deal with terrorists more positively. Employment in the LEAs should be 
perceived as a sacred service to the populace of the country. 
• Alienate the local public from the terrorists and augment the role of a civil 
citizenry to maintain peace and tranquility in their respective areas. 
• Help the masses of affected areas join the national mainstream without 
fear of the terrorists. Focus especially on the educational facilities in 
remote areas of the country. 
b. Training Methodology 
The training methodology190 of LEAs for a swift and matching response 
against terrorists should flow from the training philosophy and should be institutionalized 
at all levels as follows: 
(1) Training Directive. A general training directive should be 
issued encompassing terrorist threats and responses. All LEA training institutions should 
                                                 
189 Sajid Chaudhry, “National Transport Policy to be Presented for Cabinet’s Approval,” Daily Times, 
October 18, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C10%5C18%5Cstory_18-10-
2008_pg5_4 (accessed October 23, 2008).  
190 The salient aspects of training methodology have been prepared by the author through extensive 
discussions with the police officials in Pakistan including Inspector Muhammad Akhtar, who is the elder 
brother of the author and is presently serving at the biggest Police Training Center Sihala, Rawalpindi. 
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prepare a comprehensive syllabus, based on this directive, to impart training to their men. 
The training emphasis, especially for the officers of the LEAs, should focus on the 
following aspects. 
• Planning and handling of various complex terrorist situations 
• Conducting operations in isolation and in coordination with other LEAs at 
team/sub team levels, particularly for countering potential suicide bombers 
• Managing legal matters, handling of captured terrorists and interrogation 
techniques including access to forensic laboratories191 
• Conducting psychological operations, public relations, and the art of 
negotiation and persuasion of people with due respect to their cultures and 
traditions 
• Developing an analytical thought process, especially for handling different 
complicated situations and media personnel 
(2) Training Institutions. Presently, all the LEAs of Pakistan 
have a limited number of individual training centers, and there is no institution for joint 
training at national level. At least five national level training institutions should be 
established, one at each national and provincial capital in the country. The training of 
should be planned progressively, starting with the respective training institutions of the 
LEAs and culminating in joint training at national level training institutions under the IS 
council.  
The training institutions of the LEAs in Pakistan should arrange 
exchange training programs with developed countries to benefit from the law 
enforcement experience of contemporary LEAs. The Department of Homeland Security 
in the U.S., Scotland Yard in the United Kingdom and police departments in Germany 
and Canada may be few of the good institutions for the said exchange program.192       
                                                 
191 Kellie Ortega, “Anti Terrorist Laws in Pakistan,” http://www.india-
seminar.com/2002/512/512%20kellie%20ortega.htm (accessed October 23, 2008).  
192 Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2008), 15. 
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c. Subjects of the Training 
The training module of LEAs in Pakistan should keep evolving to ensure 
that their manpower is adequately skilled to take on new techniques adopted by terrorists. 
A research and analysis wing, on a national level under the IS Council, can perform the 
task of continuously evaluating the training system and suggesting necessary 
modifications. Presently, individual, sub-team, and team training should focus the 
following: 
• Techniques of antiterrorist operations in urban areas, with special 
emphasis on the avoidance of collateral damage 
• Weapon handling to include firing from various positions, on the move, 
and at moving vehicles 
• Unarmed combat, sniper skills, and the use of explosives 
• Patrolling of trouble spots, cordon and search operations 
• Establishing of road blocks and check posts as well as surveillance and 
spot checks of vehicles, personnel and houses 
• Imposition of curfew, ambushes, raids, apprehension of terrorists and the 
interception or sealing off of operation areas 
• Riot and mob control and search of civilians singly or jointly 
• First aid and interaction with the media and civil society 
E. ORGANIZATION RELATED ASPECTS 
1. New Raising 
The LEAs are comprised of a few specially trained outfits to face difficult 
situations created by terrorists. The state of affairs in the police department is particularly 
disturbing, as they often make ad hoc arrangements to fight complex law and order 
scenarios. The following set-ups should be a priority to enhance the proficiency of LEAs 
in controlling terrorism in the country. 
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a. The Police Department 
(1) Platoon Size. It is a quick reaction force (30-40 personnel), 
suitably equipped with latest weapons, operational gear, communication systems, and 
reliable vehicles, should be raised at each Tehsil level. While acting as a readily available 
special reserve in each Tehsil, this force should be prepared to respond promptly to any 
terrorism threat in their area of responsibility. 
(2) Company Size. It is an antiterrorist force (100-150 
personnel), equipped and prepared along the lines of the above mentioned quick reaction 
force, should be raised at each district level.193 After central training and coordination, 
this force should be split among two or three places in the district at the discretion of the 
District Police Officer. It should act as an exclusive force to proactively deal with 
terrorism anywhere in the respective district. 
(3) “B Areas.” In these areas of Balochistan Province, where 
the Levies are responsible for maintaining law and order should be declared “A areas,” 
and the police force in those areas should be organized on the same lines as other districts 
of the country. The existing Levies force can be merged into the police department 
without creating a vacuum of the law enforcement in those areas.194 Similarly, the 
Frontier Constabulary in the tribal areas can also be merged into the police department. 
(4) District Level. At least one bomb disposal squad and an 
explosive section should be raised at each district level. They should work in close 
coordination with the quick reaction forces at Tehsils and the antiterrorist forces at a 
district level. 
                                                 
193 Though not very well organized, the federal and provincial police have created a few outfits called 
anti terrorist squads. Recently a suicide bomber struck the headquarters of one such outfit in Islamabad. 
More details can be found on http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/10/09/pakistan-blast.html (accessed 
October 24, 2008). 
194 “Levies-Police Merger to Help Curb Crime: Official,” Dawn, September 27, 2005, 
http://www.dawn.com/2005/09/27/nat13.htm (accessed October 23, 2008). 
 87
b. Civil Armed Forces 
The following units should be raised in the FC (NWFP and Balochistan) 
and Rangers (Punjab and Sind) to enhance their efficiency against terrorism and their role 
with military during the war.  
• 1-2 antiterrorist wings, fully equipped and trained to fight terrorism as 
their main role and support the military in war as a secondary role. Some 
of the CAFs are already in the procress of raising these wings. They 
should be expedited and financed for optimal efficiency. 
• A logistics battalion to ensure the administration and logistics of the 
respective CAF, while deployed in a law enforcement role 
• A repair and maintenance battalion, capable of extending its services 
beyond the garrisons of the CAFs 
• An engineering battalion organized into bomb disposal squads and 
explosive detection sub units 
• An ordinance unit to ensure the supply of ammunition 
2. Increase in Manpower of the LEAs 
As discussed earlier, the LEAs are functioning with a serious deficiency of 
authorized manpower, which needs to be addressed as a priority.195 The government of 
Pakistan should take immediate measures to fill all vacancies in the LEAs, along with 
planning an augmentation of manpower, where required. A board of police officers from 
all the provinces should be created under the Secretary Interior to rationally evaluate the 
authorized manpower of the police in each district according to the population growth in 
the respective area, and thereafter, determine enhancements of the police force and police 
stations. 
Similarly, more wings are required for CAFs to effectively conduct both internal 
security tasks and their customary border protection duties. As a long- term measure, the 
plan should include a wing in each Corps as a reserve to achieve flexibility and quick 
reaction capability against the growing menace of the terrorism in the country. 
                                                 
195 Mansab Dogar, “431 ASIs to be Transferred to District Police,” Daily Times, November 10, 2008, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C11%5C10%5Cstory_10-11-2008_pg13_1 
(accessed November 12, 2008). 
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The present arrangement of posting military officers on deputation to the CAFs 
should be revisited. Instead, these forces should permanently commission their own 
officers. Though it may not be possible to replace all the officers immediately, the 
process can be started by getting vacancies at the Police Academy Sihala and Pakistan 
Military Academy Kakul. As a long-term measure, a training academy for officers of the 
CAFs should be established, preferably in Islamabad, and newly commissioned officers 
of the Rangers and FC should be trained there. 
3. Communication Infrastructure 
Presently, the LEAs possess High Frequency (HF) sets, which are cumbersome 
and prone to easy jamming and disruption by terrorists during operations.196 These sets 
should be replaced with the latest light weight Very High Frequency (VHF) radio sets, 
which are more secure tools of communication. Duplicate lines communication should 
also be established at all police stations and check posts, so they remain connected with 
each other despite individual line problems. During their mandatory training courses, 
LEA personnel should be educated to code and decode messages on wireless networks 
for security purposes, as this is one of the significant grey areas in the communication 
systems of LEAs in Pakistan. 
4. Transportation System 
The prevalent scarcity of agile and robust vehicles in the police department and 
the nonexistence of second line transport in the CAFs necessitate the provision of 
superior quality vehicles to LEAs. This will enable them to react to any terrorist threat 





                                                 
196 National Police Bureau, “Nationwide Integrated Radio Communication System for Police,” 
http://www.npb.gov.pk/Backup%20%5B260608%5D/projects/radio_communication_system.asp (accessed 
October 30, 2008).  
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sufficient quantity of fuel, is likely to both change the sluggish attitude of LEAs about 
law enforcement and diminish the appalling trend in which victims are forced to arrange 
for transport.197 
In addition to ground mobility, the LEAs, especially the police, should own a 
minimum number of aviation assets for a swift response against terrorists. It is 
recommended that at each LEA level, one aviation squadron should be authorized to 
ensure the speedy and effective employment of the quick reaction forces. This will also 
provide prompt intelligence, casualty evacuation, logistics support and assistance in the 
pursuit of fleeing miscreants and terrorists. 
5. Allocation of Special Equipment 
In order to safeguard against mines, protect convoys from ambushes, neutralize 
heavily armed terrorists and potential suicide bombers, and reduce the number of 
casualties in operations, it is essential to equip LEA personnel with practical, modern 
protective gear. This required special equipment includes night vision goggles, vehicle 
scanners, explosive ordinance disposal suits, bulletproof jackets, mine detectors, laser 
ranger finders, global positioning systems, anti mine shoes, and lightweight helmets. 
6. Procurement of Weapons and Equipment 
The current weapons and equipment procurement process in Pakistan is quite 
laborious and involves many ministries for the endorsement of even trivial items. As a 
onetime measure, it may be prudent to constitute a board of officers from all involved 
ministries under the proposed IS council to work out and fulfill the minimum 
requirements of weapons and equipment for LEAs. Subsequently, weapons can be 
replenished through a more rapid process enforced by the Federal Ministry of Interior. 
The Government of Pakistan should allocate a special budget to procure the said 
weapons and equipment for LEAs. The U.S. government, which is already helping 
                                                 
197 Hassan Abbas, “Police Reform: Agenda of Change,” March 4, 2008, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18117/police_reforms.html?breadcrum (accessed October 
13, 2008).  
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Pakistan undertake the reforms of the FC, should assist Pakistan financially to equip her 
LEAs in a befitting manner. Although it is difficult to project the cost of the said project 
accurately, U.S. aid of one to two billion dollars every year exclusively for the up-
gradation of Pakistani LEAs can produce excellent results in few years.   
7. More Artillery and Mortar Assets 
The existing terrorist threat has grown quite substantial, and the LEAs cannot 
fight them with small arms alone. This is particularly relevant in the tribal areas near the 
Pak-Afghan border, where the terrorists have safe havens. The use of artillery is a 
requirement to pin down and annihilate terrorists in inaccessible areas. Presently, 
authorized artillery and mortar batteries are insufficient, therefore additional artillery 
batteries are recommended for each of the FC and Ranger Corps. 
8. Surveillance of Borders 
Despite the fact that Pakistan has established more than one hundred posts on 
their side of the Pak-Afghan border and similar NATO and Afghan forces are deployed 
on the Afghanistan side, large gaps continue to exist and the terrorists conveniently travel 
back and forth from one country to another.198 The porous border, coupled with the 
difficult terrain and innumerable routes, necessitates the procurement of surveillance 
equipment. 
At least one ground surveillance radar, mounted on a mobile platform, should be 
provided to each wing of the FC, which is normally deployed along a front of 100 
kilometers. Moreover, each post should be outfitted with a minimum of 1-2 Sophie Night 
Sights, which can help track and identify the intruders at a reasonable distance. This will 
enable an appropriate response from the LEAs’ personnel.199  
                                                 
198 Global Security.Org, “Pak-Afghan Border Remains in Profile,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/pakistan/2005/pakistan-051003-irna01.htm (accessed 
November 2, 2008). 
199 “Electronic Surveillance on Pak-Afghan Border,” The Times of India, December 28, 2006, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/966285.cms (accessed November 7, 2008).  
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F. CHANGING THE OUTLOOK OF THE LEAS 
While the traditional training and law enforcement processes have their merits, it 
may be valuable to explore how to make the LEAs of Pakistan more effective in the 
modern counter-terrorism matrix of the twenty first century. The following are some of 
the measures, which can help change the outlook of LEA personnel. 
1. Changing the Mindset 
The LEAs have to work assiduously to change the medieval mindset of the rank 
and file who deal with traditional miscreants and law abiders. They have to be cultured to 
keep themselves abreast of the ingenuity today’s terrorists and the inventiveness of the 
crime world with which they are confronted.200 There is no alternative to periodic 
orientation courses, specifically designed for LEA personnel, to educate them on the 
latest trends and innovative techniques adopted by the terrorists. The overall focus should 
be to prepare all ranks of the LEAs to adopt a preemptive approach, thereby changing 
their reactive mindset.  
2. Technology Orientation to Training 
The training curriculum for LEAs should include an awareness of modern 
communication means, including the use of the Internet. Unless it is implemented at the 
recruit level, the forces will remain unable to use modern technological tools, and 
outmoded methods of addressing the problem of law enforcement will continue. Each 
LEA should be provided a sufficient number of computers with internet access at their 
training centers, and they should encourage students to study, debate and evaluate up-to-
the-minute applications of the technology to maintain law and order. They should 
specifically focus on countering terrorist techniques like cyber crimes with the latest 
technological gadgets. 
                                                 
200 John Swartz, “Terrorists’ Use of Internet Spreads,” USA Today, February 21, 2005, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2005-02-20-cyber-terror-usat_x.htm (accessed 
November 9, 2008). 
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3. Creation of a Terrorist Database 
A comprehensive database of terrorists, their criminal allies, and fellow travelers 
needs to be created, maintained and regularly updated at each LEA. The databases should 
also be easily accessible to other LEAs. The research and development section of each 
LEA should constantly evaluate the pattern of terrorist activities in the country and 
propose a modus operandi for pre-emptive measures.  
4. Network Centric Response 
The present socio-religious-politico-ethnic matrix in Pakistan is a serious security 
challenge for the LEAs of the country. This scenario necessitates intimate inter-agency 
coordination at all times on every level to gain up-to-date information and generate the 
requisite response. A “Modern Network System,” with terrorist databases, linked 
vertically and horizontally among all the LEAs of the country, and updated on a real time 
basis would accelerate the response. Such modern trends are vital to contemporary anti-
terrorism, and LEAs must pay special attention to them. 
5. War-Gaming by the LEAs 
Military forces the world over successfully adopt the war-gaming technique to 
test their operational plans.201 Such war-gaming, both at the respective LEA level and the 
joint level, should be developed and practiced. This is particularly important for senior 
officers to hone their leadership skills, logical reasoning, and decision-making in 
simulated terrorism situations. Frequent rehearsals of simulated situations will help 
formulate standard operating procedures for effective responses at various levels, create a 
common platform for all the LEAs, and reduce the failure of operations.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The perilous, complex terrorism of this century is a potent threat not only to 
Pakistan but to the whole of humankind. The manifestations of this threat are not 
                                                 
201 Ayaz Ahmad Khan, “Armed Forces War Gaming,” 
http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/august/gaming.htm (accessed October 30, 2008). 
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restricted to any particular area, region or society. They are frightening to the inhabitants 
of all corners of the globe. The wide spectrum of the terrorist activities and the variety of 
circumstances leading to their initiation presents an enormous challenge to the experts 
and policy makers of the world. 
The menace of terrorism is further complicated by the existing differences among 
various state and non state actors and their diverging interests. Within each society, 
particularly in the Muslim world, different segments of the population interpret the 
rationale behind religious terrorism differently. Problems with the implementation of the 
GWOT and abuses associated with it have further compounded the situation. Therefore, 
the unanimous characterization of terrorism has become a dilemma, despite the fact that 
world has already commemorated the seventh anniversary of the dreadful events of 9/11-
an event led to extensive research and exploration of the rationale behind Islamic 
terrorism. 
Today, the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular stand at the 
epicenter of the predicament of terrorism.202 A delicate amalgamation of religious and 
political interests, the existence of international terrorist networks, and across states 
sponsorship has institutionalized terrorism as a cheap mode of warfare not only against 
non-Muslims but also believers in Islam. Since 9/11, Pakistan has turned out to be one of 
the biggest victims of terrorism along with Iraq and Afghanistan.  
In Pakistan, more than two thousands personnel from the military and LEAs have 
lost their lives; thousands of her citizens have been killed or maimed by the terrorist 
activities. The state infrastructure has been devastated, and the economic stability of the 
country has been ruined. Despite the enormous sacrifices of the LEAs, their inadequate 
operational capacity, grave scarcity of requisite resources, and organizational ineptitude 
have proved be major impediments to significant success against the terrorists. Similarly, 
the lead role of the military in counter terrorist operations, instead of LEAs, has its own 
ramifications elaborated in Chapter II.   
                                                 
202 Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2008), 5. 
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An overall view of the phenomenon of terrorism in Pakistan, which was discussed 
at length in Chapter III, reveals that political, social and economic efforts with a 
controlled use of force are perhaps the keys to success for the ongoing counter terrorism 
campaign. This requires a concerted response not only at the governmental level but also 
at agency and individual levels. Every effort should be undertaken to resolve the menace 
of terrorism amicably, through a process of dialogue; however, the option of force 
remains an essential component of the overall strategy against today’s terrorists. 
In such scenarios, the role of LEAs in Pakistan cannot be over emphasized. They 
will be a linchpin in the law and order affairs of the country for years to come, and 
consequently their restructuring, training and funding, as highlighted in Chapters IV and 
V, should be key areas of concern for Pakistan’s government. Chapter VI illustrates a set 
of recommendations for the up-gradation of LEAs, which need to be considered 
seriously. No stone should be left unturned to transform the LEAs of Pakistan into an 
invincible security mechanism against the looming threat of terrorism. Pakistan has no 
alternative but to organize, equip, train, and groom their LEAs to rise to the occasion and 
take on this emerging threat of terrorism squarely and with determination. 
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